Page 214 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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What Do We Know about the World?
of persuasion within the particular subject. Paul A. Rahe (2008: 23)
adds that logos “makes it possible [...] to perceive and make clear to oth-
ers through reasoned discourse the difference between what is advanta-
geous and what is harmful, between what is just and what is unjust, and
between what is good and what is evil”, which undeniably differentiates
us from animals.
Logos is composed of an issue lying at the heart of a debate which
needs to be identified, arguments which will support the issue ad-
dressed, the structure of thought which underpins the arguments, co-
herence and logical value.
Prior to examining which classes of arguments the speakers or writ-
ers employ in the persuasive process of the genre under investigation, we
shall elaborate on their types. Aristotle (1959: 265) distinguishes three
classes of arguments which need to be applied by the orators, firstly, the
topic of the possible and impossible, secondly, that a thing will happen
or has happened, thirdly, the topic of magnitude. The possible explicates
that of two contrary things one is possible, so is the other one; analogi-
cally, if of two similar things, one is possible, so is the other one (an argu-
ment a fortiori). The possible, therefore, constitutes the source of argu-
ments for the impossible being the opposite of what has been said about
the possible. As to a thing that will happen or has happened, Aristot-
le (1959: 173–273) maintains that if a foundation is laid to believe or if
a certain premise has been made that something has happened or will
happen, then something will most probably have happened. Finally, to-
pos of magnitude, Aristotle (ibid.) holds that all men use extenuation
and amplification (exaggeration of both great and small things) in de-
liberating, praising or blaming, accusing or defending, for “the particu-
lar has more authority than the general”. Not only can the topics of ar-
gument stimulate the persuader’s mind, but also structure the persua-
sive discourse, enabling the speaker/writer to make use of all available
means, which consequently serve the speaker in preparing his/her com-
positions. Nevertheless, topics, if applied too scrupulously, can deprive
a composition of its originality and inventiveness.
Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005: 83–107), in turn, provide us with
ten models of argument, as they call them, substituting topoi with mod-
els, meaning “adaptable, flexible concepts”, offering “systematic and or-
ganising methods of ‘thinking through’ a topic, and of selecting and or-
ganising the most effective arguments”. The models of argument which
will be discussed are as follows: definition, cause and effect, similarity, op-
of persuasion within the particular subject. Paul A. Rahe (2008: 23)
adds that logos “makes it possible [...] to perceive and make clear to oth-
ers through reasoned discourse the difference between what is advanta-
geous and what is harmful, between what is just and what is unjust, and
between what is good and what is evil”, which undeniably differentiates
us from animals.
Logos is composed of an issue lying at the heart of a debate which
needs to be identified, arguments which will support the issue ad-
dressed, the structure of thought which underpins the arguments, co-
herence and logical value.
Prior to examining which classes of arguments the speakers or writ-
ers employ in the persuasive process of the genre under investigation, we
shall elaborate on their types. Aristotle (1959: 265) distinguishes three
classes of arguments which need to be applied by the orators, firstly, the
topic of the possible and impossible, secondly, that a thing will happen
or has happened, thirdly, the topic of magnitude. The possible explicates
that of two contrary things one is possible, so is the other one; analogi-
cally, if of two similar things, one is possible, so is the other one (an argu-
ment a fortiori). The possible, therefore, constitutes the source of argu-
ments for the impossible being the opposite of what has been said about
the possible. As to a thing that will happen or has happened, Aristot-
le (1959: 173–273) maintains that if a foundation is laid to believe or if
a certain premise has been made that something has happened or will
happen, then something will most probably have happened. Finally, to-
pos of magnitude, Aristotle (ibid.) holds that all men use extenuation
and amplification (exaggeration of both great and small things) in de-
liberating, praising or blaming, accusing or defending, for “the particu-
lar has more authority than the general”. Not only can the topics of ar-
gument stimulate the persuader’s mind, but also structure the persua-
sive discourse, enabling the speaker/writer to make use of all available
means, which consequently serve the speaker in preparing his/her com-
positions. Nevertheless, topics, if applied too scrupulously, can deprive
a composition of its originality and inventiveness.
Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005: 83–107), in turn, provide us with
ten models of argument, as they call them, substituting topoi with mod-
els, meaning “adaptable, flexible concepts”, offering “systematic and or-
ganising methods of ‘thinking through’ a topic, and of selecting and or-
ganising the most effective arguments”. The models of argument which
will be discussed are as follows: definition, cause and effect, similarity, op-
