Page 98 - Oswald Ducrot, Slovenian Lectures, Digitalna knjižnica/Digital Library, Dissertationes 6
P. 98
Slovenian Lectures
only the enunciators, those utterances can be described in the same way: one
enunciator applies the topical form with more, and another, the converse top-
ical form with less. I shall account for the difference by considering the atti-
tude of the locutor. For “Peter has worked little”, I shall say that the locutor re-
jects E1’s point of view but admits or recognises that he does not regard it as
completely unjustified. In the case of not, on the contrary, his attitude towards
E1 was absolute rejection. Thereby, I acknowledge the fact that in saying “Pe-
ter has worked little”, to a point, one does admit that Peter has worked, which,
within my theoretical framework, means a recognition that, in another dis-
course, a positive topical form associated with the word work could be applied
to him. But, in what he is now saying, the locutor identifies with enunciator
E2 and, again in what he is now saying, he is using a negative topical form, for
example “less work, less tiredness”. By bringing in topical forms, I can there-
fore establish a parallel between different forms, that are felt as being related
to one another, of an attitude which I call negativity. The difference between
those forms is merely in the attitudes of the locutor regarding the different
enunciators. With that last example, which I have barely outlined the analysis
of, what I have time to tell you about the introduction of argumentation with-
in linguistic analysis is complete.
***
If you are not at the end of your patience, I would now like to say a few
more words to conclude. You will have noticed that in these lectures, I have
often spoken badly about the notion of truth. In the first lecture already, I
told you that I refused to work with that notion. But that does not prevent
my coming across it all the time. Consequently, I would like to speak of the
relationship there may be between a linguist and the notion of truth. Three
types of encounters can occur between them, I think.
First type of encounter: the notion of truth can be an object for the lin-
guist. In all languages I think, there are words like true and false: I have nev-
er heard of a language that does not have equivalents for the words true and
false found in Indo-European languages. The linguist, who describes the
words of a language, must also describe the words true and false: that is part
of our work in so much as we describe the lexicon of languages. So, that
first type of encounter between the linguist and truth is an inevitable, ines-
capable one. But those words of the language-system, let me point out, do
not at all have the value that those same words have in the language of lo-
gicians: the “true” and the “false” of the language-system are totally differ-
ent from those of logicians. In French, I can say “This bank-note is a false
only the enunciators, those utterances can be described in the same way: one
enunciator applies the topical form with more, and another, the converse top-
ical form with less. I shall account for the difference by considering the atti-
tude of the locutor. For “Peter has worked little”, I shall say that the locutor re-
jects E1’s point of view but admits or recognises that he does not regard it as
completely unjustified. In the case of not, on the contrary, his attitude towards
E1 was absolute rejection. Thereby, I acknowledge the fact that in saying “Pe-
ter has worked little”, to a point, one does admit that Peter has worked, which,
within my theoretical framework, means a recognition that, in another dis-
course, a positive topical form associated with the word work could be applied
to him. But, in what he is now saying, the locutor identifies with enunciator
E2 and, again in what he is now saying, he is using a negative topical form, for
example “less work, less tiredness”. By bringing in topical forms, I can there-
fore establish a parallel between different forms, that are felt as being related
to one another, of an attitude which I call negativity. The difference between
those forms is merely in the attitudes of the locutor regarding the different
enunciators. With that last example, which I have barely outlined the analysis
of, what I have time to tell you about the introduction of argumentation with-
in linguistic analysis is complete.
***
If you are not at the end of your patience, I would now like to say a few
more words to conclude. You will have noticed that in these lectures, I have
often spoken badly about the notion of truth. In the first lecture already, I
told you that I refused to work with that notion. But that does not prevent
my coming across it all the time. Consequently, I would like to speak of the
relationship there may be between a linguist and the notion of truth. Three
types of encounters can occur between them, I think.
First type of encounter: the notion of truth can be an object for the lin-
guist. In all languages I think, there are words like true and false: I have nev-
er heard of a language that does not have equivalents for the words true and
false found in Indo-European languages. The linguist, who describes the
words of a language, must also describe the words true and false: that is part
of our work in so much as we describe the lexicon of languages. So, that
first type of encounter between the linguist and truth is an inevitable, ines-
capable one. But those words of the language-system, let me point out, do
not at all have the value that those same words have in the language of lo-
gicians: the “true” and the “false” of the language-system are totally differ-
ent from those of logicians. In French, I can say “This bank-note is a false
