Page 95 - Oswald Ducrot, Slovenian Lectures, Digitalna knjižnica/Digital Library, Dissertationes 6
P. 95
Lecture V
remember the experiment carried out by a psychologist which showed that,
under certain circumstances, when there were two quantities to assess us-
ing little and a little, it was always the weaker quantity which summoned lit-
tle and the greater, a little; but given the discourse-situation, I had deduced
or derived that informational difference between little and a little from an
argumentative difference which to me seemed deeper, deeper in this sense
that argumentation seemed to explain information in a certain number of
cases whereas information never seems to explain argumentation. I am not
claiming that the results which I have reached are final nor especially that
they are general enough but as from little and a little, I did want to show
the direction I am working in. The point is to introduce argumentation in
linguistic meaning, and from it, to derive the informational components
that one observes in the meaning of utterances produced in particular dis-
course-situations.
***
I take another example, the last example of this series of lectures: the exam-
ple of negation. I would like to show how I bring in topoi and topical forms
within the description of negation. First, I remind you of what I said when I
introduced negation from a polyphonic point of view. Take the utterance “Pe-
ter hasn’t worked”. I told you that the utterance represented two enunciators,
E1 and E2: E1 is a point of view from which Peter has worked and on the oth-
er hand, E2 disagrees with E1. That description that I gave was a provisional
one which I hope I will be able to improve upon through the theory of argu-
mentation. You can see why I am not completely satisfied with it. The thing
is that at least apparently, it maintains an informational point of view at the
level of enunciator E1: E1 gives the information that “Peter has worked”, and
then E2 disagrees with that. So, in that polyphonic description of negation,
as I have explained it, I have maintained an informational component within
the linguistic description of negation. Well, I think I can now get rid of that
informational component, at least in a certain number of cases.
I must make a remark before going on. For what reason, in that exam-
ple, do I want to avoid bringing in a propositional content (in Searle’s sense)
or a piece of information like “Peter has worked”? The reason is that the ex-
pression “Peter has worked”, properly speaking, does not convey information.
What is one saying when one says that “He has worked”? One does not really
know. Many people, granted, think when I stride back and forth in my office
muttering linguistic examples that I am not working; and they may be per-
fectly right to think so. Many of my friends in Paris think that, here in Ljublja-
remember the experiment carried out by a psychologist which showed that,
under certain circumstances, when there were two quantities to assess us-
ing little and a little, it was always the weaker quantity which summoned lit-
tle and the greater, a little; but given the discourse-situation, I had deduced
or derived that informational difference between little and a little from an
argumentative difference which to me seemed deeper, deeper in this sense
that argumentation seemed to explain information in a certain number of
cases whereas information never seems to explain argumentation. I am not
claiming that the results which I have reached are final nor especially that
they are general enough but as from little and a little, I did want to show
the direction I am working in. The point is to introduce argumentation in
linguistic meaning, and from it, to derive the informational components
that one observes in the meaning of utterances produced in particular dis-
course-situations.
***
I take another example, the last example of this series of lectures: the exam-
ple of negation. I would like to show how I bring in topoi and topical forms
within the description of negation. First, I remind you of what I said when I
introduced negation from a polyphonic point of view. Take the utterance “Pe-
ter hasn’t worked”. I told you that the utterance represented two enunciators,
E1 and E2: E1 is a point of view from which Peter has worked and on the oth-
er hand, E2 disagrees with E1. That description that I gave was a provisional
one which I hope I will be able to improve upon through the theory of argu-
mentation. You can see why I am not completely satisfied with it. The thing
is that at least apparently, it maintains an informational point of view at the
level of enunciator E1: E1 gives the information that “Peter has worked”, and
then E2 disagrees with that. So, in that polyphonic description of negation,
as I have explained it, I have maintained an informational component within
the linguistic description of negation. Well, I think I can now get rid of that
informational component, at least in a certain number of cases.
I must make a remark before going on. For what reason, in that exam-
ple, do I want to avoid bringing in a propositional content (in Searle’s sense)
or a piece of information like “Peter has worked”? The reason is that the ex-
pression “Peter has worked”, properly speaking, does not convey information.
What is one saying when one says that “He has worked”? One does not really
know. Many people, granted, think when I stride back and forth in my office
muttering linguistic examples that I am not working; and they may be per-
fectly right to think so. Many of my friends in Paris think that, here in Ljublja-
