Page 150 - Šolsko polje, XXXI, 2020, 3-4: Convention on the Rights of the Child: Educational Opportunities and Social Justice, eds. Zdenko Kodelja and Urška Štremfel
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šolsko polje, letnik xxxi, številka 3–4

Such an educational policy of the state and the universities should be
considered irresponsible. And unconstitutional. Lawyers should careful-
ly examine the arguments about the legal contestability of such behaviour
and the extremely harmful consequences for a growing number of young
graduates.18 A society with such university policies and practices cannot
claim to be a knowledge-based society. Instead, it is a society of the fate-
ful intertwining of legal ignorance, political arbitrariness, economic bru-
tality and ethical perversion (Bauman, 2016). It leaves young people in the
grip of nihilism and a crisis of meaning, something that must be coun-
tered (Splichal, 2010).

The signs chosen by Slovenian public universities to achieve the goal
of a progressive society and a knowledge-based value society are not op-
timistic. I maintain the public universities do not care enough about the
development of critically thinking citizens, ethically aware people, mor-
al personalities and civil, courageous intellectuals who are motivated and
equipped with knowledge. Universities do not care enough about the de-
velopment of self-confident young generations (a vast problem addressed
by Galimberti (2010) that represents one, but the most important, out-
come of this obvious fact). Universities still do not care enough about
knowledge as a value, about morally sound and rationally persuasive ed-
ucation (Haidt, 2013) as something that is an end in itself in the educa-
tional process (as opposed to assessing the value of knowledge in rela-
tion to its mere value as measured by the market) (comp. Splichal, 2002;
Burawoy, n.d.). Yet, this concern is far from being entirely dependent on
the legal and political stance that any government coalition adopts to-
wards universities.19

18 My personal and professional conviction has always been that the mere pursuit of the
cruelty of the ‘letter of the law’ is the most primitive form of the rule of law and the highest
degree of obstruction of the rule of law. Even the fundamental questions about right and
wrong, the acceptable and unacceptable, the permitted and prohibited must directly
affect the most important values (we create these people more than we discover them),
moral answers (initially intuitive, Haidt 2013, Part 1) and ethical considerations (about
decency, suitability and general utility), which are not originally conditioned by a system
of authoritatively enacted formal rules and are functionally independent of the letter of
the law. It must be exactly the opposite. The judicial system, public administration and
structured systemic violence, which are exercised through the terror of dehumanised
thoughtlessness, bureaucracy and paperwork, work in reverse. Instead of the rule of law,
therefore, legalistic legalism and paper legalism (legal transcription) prevail (also in the
courts). Instead of the ethics of right and wrong, there is a relativism of what is allowed:
systemically protected actors are allowed to do anything that is not expressly forbidden,
with the possibility of taking responsibility for the service of an expressly forbidden
exception to the rule. Justice does not really exist. Constitutionalism is treated as a
disruption to the system. Democracy is only formally eligible for election (Teršek, 2018a).

19 See the Magna Charta Universitatum, which states that “the future of humanity depends
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