Page 149 - Šolsko polje, XXXI, 2020, 3-4: Convention on the Rights of the Child: Educational Opportunities and Social Justice, eds. Zdenko Kodelja and Urška Štremfel
P. 149
teršek ■ public universities in post-socialist states could become ‘un-academic’ ...
Study programmes with ballast and deception
A very important, yet almost overlooked, aspect of the public debate on
university policy in Slovenia is the university’s positioning within the
framework of constitutional legislation. It has its roots in the recognisable
and ethically questionable way in which (not only private, but also) public
educational institutions pragmatically and profitably try to adapt to the
legal framework and policies of the state, with the main goal of increas-
ing the number of enrolled students.17 In accordance with the rigid math-
ematics of systemic rules and the paper-based logic of defining remunera-
tion criteria, university professors are simply paid by the concrete number
of teaching hours (measured in decimal numbers). These hours depend on
the number of subjects they teach, with these hours in turn depending on
the number of students: a system that can easily be manipulated. The pro-
fessors most sought after by students can easily lose their subjects, their
hours, their salary – and their position, their job.
Slovenia provides some examples of study programmes that appear
to have been prepared surprisingly quickly, less precisely in terms of sub-
ject matter, not fully thought out in terms of personnel and logistically in-
adequate. In practice, certain study programmes do not follow the origi-
nal and officially registered content, and the prognoses given by deans or
study programme coordinators ‘as a promise’ or ‘a legitimate expectation’
regarding the students’ employability sometimes amount to plain decep-
tion, lies and cheating.
Some of these study programmes were later exposed for the lies, ma-
nipulation, deception and fraud as concerns the value of their diplomas
and employability. One case was taken to court. I asked students to file a
lawsuit against the State which, while allowing the registration of the pro-
gramme (invoking the constitutional doctrine of the positive obligations of
the State) (Mowbray, 2004; Teršek, 2014, pp. 312–322), did not ensure the
graduates’ employability by including their official academic titles in the
Official Gazette; no admission, no official professional title, no employa-
bility. Instead, they filed legal proceedings against the faculty! The court
found no manipulation, no fraud and no deception. The students kept
their diplomas (more or less as worthless paper) and became unemployed.
17 See Estermann and Nokkala (2009, pp. 18–26). The authors of the research find that in
Slovenia there is in principle a system of integrated, ‘one-block’ funding of the university,
but this is subject to extensive categorisation, which limits the financial independence of
the university. They also note the trend of the (at least partial) conditionality of funding
with financial formulas based on both ‘input-related’ criteria (e.g. number of students
enrolled in the first year) and ‘performance-based’ criteria (e.g. number of new graduates).
147
Study programmes with ballast and deception
A very important, yet almost overlooked, aspect of the public debate on
university policy in Slovenia is the university’s positioning within the
framework of constitutional legislation. It has its roots in the recognisable
and ethically questionable way in which (not only private, but also) public
educational institutions pragmatically and profitably try to adapt to the
legal framework and policies of the state, with the main goal of increas-
ing the number of enrolled students.17 In accordance with the rigid math-
ematics of systemic rules and the paper-based logic of defining remunera-
tion criteria, university professors are simply paid by the concrete number
of teaching hours (measured in decimal numbers). These hours depend on
the number of subjects they teach, with these hours in turn depending on
the number of students: a system that can easily be manipulated. The pro-
fessors most sought after by students can easily lose their subjects, their
hours, their salary – and their position, their job.
Slovenia provides some examples of study programmes that appear
to have been prepared surprisingly quickly, less precisely in terms of sub-
ject matter, not fully thought out in terms of personnel and logistically in-
adequate. In practice, certain study programmes do not follow the origi-
nal and officially registered content, and the prognoses given by deans or
study programme coordinators ‘as a promise’ or ‘a legitimate expectation’
regarding the students’ employability sometimes amount to plain decep-
tion, lies and cheating.
Some of these study programmes were later exposed for the lies, ma-
nipulation, deception and fraud as concerns the value of their diplomas
and employability. One case was taken to court. I asked students to file a
lawsuit against the State which, while allowing the registration of the pro-
gramme (invoking the constitutional doctrine of the positive obligations of
the State) (Mowbray, 2004; Teršek, 2014, pp. 312–322), did not ensure the
graduates’ employability by including their official academic titles in the
Official Gazette; no admission, no official professional title, no employa-
bility. Instead, they filed legal proceedings against the faculty! The court
found no manipulation, no fraud and no deception. The students kept
their diplomas (more or less as worthless paper) and became unemployed.
17 See Estermann and Nokkala (2009, pp. 18–26). The authors of the research find that in
Slovenia there is in principle a system of integrated, ‘one-block’ funding of the university,
but this is subject to extensive categorisation, which limits the financial independence of
the university. They also note the trend of the (at least partial) conditionality of funding
with financial formulas based on both ‘input-related’ criteria (e.g. number of students
enrolled in the first year) and ‘performance-based’ criteria (e.g. number of new graduates).
147
