Page 76 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
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four critical essays on argumentation
not distinguish them from words and sentences, which can also be vague
and ambiguous’. (Birdsell, Groarke 1996: 2) Than they qualify this poster as
‘an amalgam of the verbal and the visual’ (ibid.), which, again, sounds quite
acceptable. But then they conclude: ‘Here the argument that you should be
wary of cigarettes because they can hook you and endanger your health is
forwarded by means of visual images ...’ (Ibid.: 3) Which is obviously not the
case. Without the verbal part, ‘don’t you get hooked!’, the poster could be
understood (framed) as a joke, as a cartoon, where, for example, smoking is
presented as such an ubiquitous activity that even anglers use cigarettes to
catch fish. Only when we add the verbal part, ‘don’t you get hooked!’—where
‘hooked’ activates a (this time semantic) frame of (semantic) knowledge re-
lating to this specific concept (Fillmore 1977: 76–138),2 which includes ‘get
addicted’, and is, at the same time, coupled with a visual representation
of a hook with a cigarette on it—is the appropriate (intended) frame set:
the poster is now understood as an anti-smoking ad, belonging to an an-
ti-smoking campaign.
Mental spaces
Equally problematic and ambiguous is the UvA poster Leo Groarke is using
in his ‘Logic, Art and Arguing’ (1996: 112):
2 Probably the most widely known slogan describing the basic feature of frame se-
mantics is due to Ch. Fillmore: ‘Meanings are relativized to scenes.’ And an often
cited example by Fillmore (1997) demonstrating the above slogan is the difference in
meaning between the following two sentences:
(1) I spent three hours on land this afternoon.
(2) I spent three hours on the ground this afternoon.
The ‘background’ scene refered to in (1) would be a sea voyage while (2) refers to an
interruption of an air travel.
76
not distinguish them from words and sentences, which can also be vague
and ambiguous’. (Birdsell, Groarke 1996: 2) Than they qualify this poster as
‘an amalgam of the verbal and the visual’ (ibid.), which, again, sounds quite
acceptable. But then they conclude: ‘Here the argument that you should be
wary of cigarettes because they can hook you and endanger your health is
forwarded by means of visual images ...’ (Ibid.: 3) Which is obviously not the
case. Without the verbal part, ‘don’t you get hooked!’, the poster could be
understood (framed) as a joke, as a cartoon, where, for example, smoking is
presented as such an ubiquitous activity that even anglers use cigarettes to
catch fish. Only when we add the verbal part, ‘don’t you get hooked!’—where
‘hooked’ activates a (this time semantic) frame of (semantic) knowledge re-
lating to this specific concept (Fillmore 1977: 76–138),2 which includes ‘get
addicted’, and is, at the same time, coupled with a visual representation
of a hook with a cigarette on it—is the appropriate (intended) frame set:
the poster is now understood as an anti-smoking ad, belonging to an an-
ti-smoking campaign.
Mental spaces
Equally problematic and ambiguous is the UvA poster Leo Groarke is using
in his ‘Logic, Art and Arguing’ (1996: 112):
2 Probably the most widely known slogan describing the basic feature of frame se-
mantics is due to Ch. Fillmore: ‘Meanings are relativized to scenes.’ And an often
cited example by Fillmore (1997) demonstrating the above slogan is the difference in
meaning between the following two sentences:
(1) I spent three hours on land this afternoon.
(2) I spent three hours on the ground this afternoon.
The ‘background’ scene refered to in (1) would be a sea voyage while (2) refers to an
interruption of an air travel.
76
