Page 74 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
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four critical essays on argumentation
Framing in visual argumentation
But, are possible or potential arguments supposedly contained in the vis-
uals really so obvious? We should recall what already Ch. S. Peirce had
pointed out more than hundred years ago (Peirce 1931-58: 2.172): ‘Nothing is
a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign.’ In other words, nothing is interpret-
ed as a sign (i.e., representing or referring to something else) unless there is
intention to see it and to understand it as a sign.
And these signs (consider figures 2, 3, and 4) can have many different
interpretations (if not framed appropriately and sufficiently):
- view of Paris (or one of the views of Paris);
- view of Paris from Notre-Dame;
- Notre-Dame on the background of Paris;
- Postcard greetings from Paris;
- some memorial photos from/of Paris;
- details of Notre-Dame architecture;
- examples of sacral architecture;
- motives from the Notre-Dame outer walls;
- mythological motives from the Notre-Dame architecture;
even
- excerpt from a book on plumbing (these Gargoyles were often
used as gutters).
What is my point in enumerating all these? Simply, that we should first
know what the (immediate) context of a visual is, and only then proceed with
the interpretation and meaning construction. Or, in Wittgenstein’s words
(Wittgenstein 1953/1986: I-#663): ‘Only when one knows the story does
one know the significance of picture.’ Which is, if we ponder a bit about
this problem, just a corollary of a much more famous 7th thesis from his
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one
must be silent.’ Applied to visuals, we could paraphrase it as: until we know
what the visual is (all) about, we cannot talk about it.
Or put it in the terms of what I will be proposing: we have to frame the
visual (or the verbal, for that matter), and perform a frame analysis first (i.e.
before proceeding to any kind of meaning construction).
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Framing in visual argumentation
But, are possible or potential arguments supposedly contained in the vis-
uals really so obvious? We should recall what already Ch. S. Peirce had
pointed out more than hundred years ago (Peirce 1931-58: 2.172): ‘Nothing is
a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign.’ In other words, nothing is interpret-
ed as a sign (i.e., representing or referring to something else) unless there is
intention to see it and to understand it as a sign.
And these signs (consider figures 2, 3, and 4) can have many different
interpretations (if not framed appropriately and sufficiently):
- view of Paris (or one of the views of Paris);
- view of Paris from Notre-Dame;
- Notre-Dame on the background of Paris;
- Postcard greetings from Paris;
- some memorial photos from/of Paris;
- details of Notre-Dame architecture;
- examples of sacral architecture;
- motives from the Notre-Dame outer walls;
- mythological motives from the Notre-Dame architecture;
even
- excerpt from a book on plumbing (these Gargoyles were often
used as gutters).
What is my point in enumerating all these? Simply, that we should first
know what the (immediate) context of a visual is, and only then proceed with
the interpretation and meaning construction. Or, in Wittgenstein’s words
(Wittgenstein 1953/1986: I-#663): ‘Only when one knows the story does
one know the significance of picture.’ Which is, if we ponder a bit about
this problem, just a corollary of a much more famous 7th thesis from his
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one
must be silent.’ Applied to visuals, we could paraphrase it as: until we know
what the visual is (all) about, we cannot talk about it.
Or put it in the terms of what I will be proposing: we have to frame the
visual (or the verbal, for that matter), and perform a frame analysis first (i.e.
before proceeding to any kind of meaning construction).
74
