Page 59 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
P. 59
fallacies: do we ‘use’ them or ‘commit’ them? ...
example cited rather than the question itself’, but in this case, we don’t
even have an example and there is certainly no question (except the one
Wodak asked). She goes on by paraphrasing(?)/explaining(?) argumentum
ad exemplum as ‘one generalizable incident’. If we set aside that she is us-
ing wrong definition and classification, and that she is obviously not famil-
iar with the standard terminology in rhetoric and argumentation (falla-
cy research included), one could wonder why a presentation of self would
be described as a ‘generalizable event’? If somebody is presenting herself,
why should that personal presentation be generalizable to others? Wodak
doesn’t say (she doesn’t even present any of the self-presentations she is re-
ferring to), but she does claim that this argumentum ad exemplum (which
is not an argumentum ad exemplum), i.e. one generalizable incident (which,
again, is not generalizable), ‘could also be analysed as employing the falla-
cy of hasty generalization’.
We are encountering two problems here: (1) Wodak claims that this
non-existing argumentum ad exemplum could be analysed as the fallacy
of hasty generalization; (2) she further claims that this non-existing argu-
mentum ad exemplum could be analysed as employing the fallacy of hasty
generalization.
Setting up fallacies as analytical procedure
A few critical remarks are in order here:
Ad 1
Once more, I would like to quote Hamblin here: ‘Fallacy of Secundum
Quid is an ever-present and unavoidable possibility in practical situations,
and any formal system that avoids it can do so only at the expense of fea-
tures essential to natural language.’ (Hamblin ibid.: 213)
But let alone Hamblin’s caveat, Wodak would first have to show that
these individual self-presentations were not presented as presentations of
self, but as events (she refers to them as ‘incidents’) that could be general-
ized, that usually are generalized, that were meant to be generalized, i.e. as
instances of a more general pattern. But she doesn’t, she doesn’t even pres-
ent the ‘examples’ she is talking about.
Ad 2
Wodak then claims that these un-existing argumenta ad exempla could
be analysed as ‘employing the fallacy of hasty generalization’. ‘Employing’
clearly implies that something was done intentionally, with a purpose of
59
example cited rather than the question itself’, but in this case, we don’t
even have an example and there is certainly no question (except the one
Wodak asked). She goes on by paraphrasing(?)/explaining(?) argumentum
ad exemplum as ‘one generalizable incident’. If we set aside that she is us-
ing wrong definition and classification, and that she is obviously not famil-
iar with the standard terminology in rhetoric and argumentation (falla-
cy research included), one could wonder why a presentation of self would
be described as a ‘generalizable event’? If somebody is presenting herself,
why should that personal presentation be generalizable to others? Wodak
doesn’t say (she doesn’t even present any of the self-presentations she is re-
ferring to), but she does claim that this argumentum ad exemplum (which
is not an argumentum ad exemplum), i.e. one generalizable incident (which,
again, is not generalizable), ‘could also be analysed as employing the falla-
cy of hasty generalization’.
We are encountering two problems here: (1) Wodak claims that this
non-existing argumentum ad exemplum could be analysed as the fallacy
of hasty generalization; (2) she further claims that this non-existing argu-
mentum ad exemplum could be analysed as employing the fallacy of hasty
generalization.
Setting up fallacies as analytical procedure
A few critical remarks are in order here:
Ad 1
Once more, I would like to quote Hamblin here: ‘Fallacy of Secundum
Quid is an ever-present and unavoidable possibility in practical situations,
and any formal system that avoids it can do so only at the expense of fea-
tures essential to natural language.’ (Hamblin ibid.: 213)
But let alone Hamblin’s caveat, Wodak would first have to show that
these individual self-presentations were not presented as presentations of
self, but as events (she refers to them as ‘incidents’) that could be general-
ized, that usually are generalized, that were meant to be generalized, i.e. as
instances of a more general pattern. But she doesn’t, she doesn’t even pres-
ent the ‘examples’ she is talking about.
Ad 2
Wodak then claims that these un-existing argumenta ad exempla could
be analysed as ‘employing the fallacy of hasty generalization’. ‘Employing’
clearly implies that something was done intentionally, with a purpose of
59
