Page 56 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
P. 56
four critical essays on argumentation
many others see Kienpointner 1996; van Eemeren, Grootendorst,
Kruiger 1987: 78–94; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992,
Lamham 1991: 77ff.; Ulrich 1992). (Reisigl, Wodak 2001: 71)
The ‘violations of these ten rules’ refer to pragma-dialectical ten rules
for critical discussion that Reisigl and Wodak introduce on the previous
page. But these ten rules for ‘rational arguing’ as Reisigl and Wodak call
them are not valid just for ‘persuasive, manipulative, discursive legitima-
tion of racist, ethnicist, sexist and other forms of discrimination’, but for
every form of discussion that aims at resolving the difference of opinion in
a rational way by means of critical discussion. Racist, ethnicist, sexist and
other forms of discrimination usually don’t aim at resolving the difference
of opinion in a rational way.
Besides that, ‘violations of these ten rules’ is the way fallacies are de-
fined in pragma-dialectics, not in rhetoric and argumentation theory in
general. In rhetoric and argumentation theory there are many different ap-
proaches to fallacies that don’t even mention those ten rules of critical dis-
cussion, even theories that are unfamiliar with those ten rules or refuse to
use them.
Another problem for this hasty DHA definition arises if we confront it
with a definition from pragma-dialectics itself:
In the pragma-dialectical approach, a fallacy is defined as a speech
act that counts as a violation of one or more of the rules for crit-
ical discussion, which impedes the resolution of a difference of
opinion. Fallacies are conceived and analysed from the same view
as Aristotle originally approached them: The dialectical perspec-
tive [my emphases]. They are incorrect, unreasonable moves in a
debate or in discussion in which (at least) two parties participate.
(van Eemeren, Garssen, Meuffels 2009: 20)
In pragma-dialectics, fallacies are conceived and analysed from the di-
alectical perspective: they are incorrect, unreasonable moves in a debate or
in a discussion. In DHA, on the contrary, a list of 14 fallacies is construct-
ed (at least in D&D: 71–74), with a short description and an even shorter ex-
ample of each one of them. On the following 200 pages occasional refer-
ences would be made to this list, without any analysis or justification why
the examples on these 200 pages (mostly taken from the press) would rep-
resent any of the 14 fallacies listed (on pages 71–74), and the ten rules for
56
many others see Kienpointner 1996; van Eemeren, Grootendorst,
Kruiger 1987: 78–94; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992,
Lamham 1991: 77ff.; Ulrich 1992). (Reisigl, Wodak 2001: 71)
The ‘violations of these ten rules’ refer to pragma-dialectical ten rules
for critical discussion that Reisigl and Wodak introduce on the previous
page. But these ten rules for ‘rational arguing’ as Reisigl and Wodak call
them are not valid just for ‘persuasive, manipulative, discursive legitima-
tion of racist, ethnicist, sexist and other forms of discrimination’, but for
every form of discussion that aims at resolving the difference of opinion in
a rational way by means of critical discussion. Racist, ethnicist, sexist and
other forms of discrimination usually don’t aim at resolving the difference
of opinion in a rational way.
Besides that, ‘violations of these ten rules’ is the way fallacies are de-
fined in pragma-dialectics, not in rhetoric and argumentation theory in
general. In rhetoric and argumentation theory there are many different ap-
proaches to fallacies that don’t even mention those ten rules of critical dis-
cussion, even theories that are unfamiliar with those ten rules or refuse to
use them.
Another problem for this hasty DHA definition arises if we confront it
with a definition from pragma-dialectics itself:
In the pragma-dialectical approach, a fallacy is defined as a speech
act that counts as a violation of one or more of the rules for crit-
ical discussion, which impedes the resolution of a difference of
opinion. Fallacies are conceived and analysed from the same view
as Aristotle originally approached them: The dialectical perspec-
tive [my emphases]. They are incorrect, unreasonable moves in a
debate or in discussion in which (at least) two parties participate.
(van Eemeren, Garssen, Meuffels 2009: 20)
In pragma-dialectics, fallacies are conceived and analysed from the di-
alectical perspective: they are incorrect, unreasonable moves in a debate or
in a discussion. In DHA, on the contrary, a list of 14 fallacies is construct-
ed (at least in D&D: 71–74), with a short description and an even shorter ex-
ample of each one of them. On the following 200 pages occasional refer-
ences would be made to this list, without any analysis or justification why
the examples on these 200 pages (mostly taken from the press) would rep-
resent any of the 14 fallacies listed (on pages 71–74), and the ten rules for
56
