Page 254 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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What Do We Know about the World?
week). The closure of this circle depends on the impossibility of disput-
ing the existence of the premises (pt. 1 in the list above), their univocal
comprehension (pt. 2), their acceptance (pt. 3), the existence of one and
only one possible connection with Q (pt. 4). Obviously, this is a very
hard set of conditions to achieve in contexts which are neither formal
nor monological (and the trial is just one of these, being linguistically
unformalised and dialogical in structure), although authors like Mon-
tesquieu and Beccaria maintained that legal science must deal with the
sciences par excellence, such as mathematics or physics.
3. A Classical Meaning of Logic
But is this the only possible way to say that something is “logical”?
If we look at classical thought we can find a different point of view, ac-
cording to which “logic” means “belonging to logos”:2 an original activity
(not created by men’s thinking but rather anticipating it) allowing men’s
speeches to name the things with a variety of words (difference), obtain-
ing however a unity of sense (identity). A “divine” power for Heraclitus
and later Plato; the revelation of the Being for Aristotle, who wrote: “Be-
ing is said in many ways” (Metaph. G 2, 1003a 32–33). So “logic” in a clas-
sical perspective does not mean compulsory in one and only one way, be-
cause there are many ways at men’s disposal: many methods are provided
for seeking the unity of sense among the multiplicity of situations. The
classical account is essentially dynamic, whereas the modern one is stat-
ic (more similar to the Ephesian philosophies: on this recently, Puppo,
2012). Perelman would have probably said that while classical thought
tends to argumentation, the modern and Cartesian one prefers demon-
stration (Manzin, 2004; 2012a). These two tours d’esprit about logic are
supported by two different metaphysics or conceptions of Being: for Pla-
to and Aristotle, Being is “discontinuous”, while for Cartesius or Hume
it is “continuous” (i.e. coherent in every part of itself, either from an an-
alytical or empirical point of view: see Manzin, 2008; 2009). In order to
avoid the thaumazein, every single thing must be linked to the other,
with no vacuum in the middle. The goal of modern logic, and particu-
larly of formal logic, is “to study such links not in order to explain their
nature, but rather and above all to make a concise catalogue of few and
2 In this context the opposite terms “classical” and “modern” are used not in a chronological sense but
in a conceptual one. In fact, there have been in ancient and medieval times some positions conceptual-
ly modern (as for instance those of Anaxagoras, Zeno, most of Neoplatonic authors etc.) and, vice
versa, in the modern age some others conceptually classical (as, in the very beginning of it, Petrarch)
(Manzin, 1994; 2008).
week). The closure of this circle depends on the impossibility of disput-
ing the existence of the premises (pt. 1 in the list above), their univocal
comprehension (pt. 2), their acceptance (pt. 3), the existence of one and
only one possible connection with Q (pt. 4). Obviously, this is a very
hard set of conditions to achieve in contexts which are neither formal
nor monological (and the trial is just one of these, being linguistically
unformalised and dialogical in structure), although authors like Mon-
tesquieu and Beccaria maintained that legal science must deal with the
sciences par excellence, such as mathematics or physics.
3. A Classical Meaning of Logic
But is this the only possible way to say that something is “logical”?
If we look at classical thought we can find a different point of view, ac-
cording to which “logic” means “belonging to logos”:2 an original activity
(not created by men’s thinking but rather anticipating it) allowing men’s
speeches to name the things with a variety of words (difference), obtain-
ing however a unity of sense (identity). A “divine” power for Heraclitus
and later Plato; the revelation of the Being for Aristotle, who wrote: “Be-
ing is said in many ways” (Metaph. G 2, 1003a 32–33). So “logic” in a clas-
sical perspective does not mean compulsory in one and only one way, be-
cause there are many ways at men’s disposal: many methods are provided
for seeking the unity of sense among the multiplicity of situations. The
classical account is essentially dynamic, whereas the modern one is stat-
ic (more similar to the Ephesian philosophies: on this recently, Puppo,
2012). Perelman would have probably said that while classical thought
tends to argumentation, the modern and Cartesian one prefers demon-
stration (Manzin, 2004; 2012a). These two tours d’esprit about logic are
supported by two different metaphysics or conceptions of Being: for Pla-
to and Aristotle, Being is “discontinuous”, while for Cartesius or Hume
it is “continuous” (i.e. coherent in every part of itself, either from an an-
alytical or empirical point of view: see Manzin, 2008; 2009). In order to
avoid the thaumazein, every single thing must be linked to the other,
with no vacuum in the middle. The goal of modern logic, and particu-
larly of formal logic, is “to study such links not in order to explain their
nature, but rather and above all to make a concise catalogue of few and
2 In this context the opposite terms “classical” and “modern” are used not in a chronological sense but
in a conceptual one. In fact, there have been in ancient and medieval times some positions conceptual-
ly modern (as for instance those of Anaxagoras, Zeno, most of Neoplatonic authors etc.) and, vice
versa, in the modern age some others conceptually classical (as, in the very beginning of it, Petrarch)
(Manzin, 1994; 2008).
