Page 253 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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taking judges seriously 253
and arbitrariness, whereas citizens have the right to know exactly what
to do or not to do and what consequences they risk in doing or not do-
ing something (Beccaria, 1982; Montesquieu, 1994). According to such
a conviction, the right thing would be to have clear and durable written
norms, similar to the axioms of the formal sciences and established by an
effective authority (the souverain: a king or a parliament). With norms
like these, the judge’s task would consist exclusively in recognizing when
a fact is relevant as a species of the normative genus: a truly logical oper-
ation of “deduction” from a general and unambiguous list of obligatory
behaviours and sanctions. This is the so-called “legal syllogism” which I
am going to describe in more detail in this article. But for the moment
let us pause a moment, and ask what idea of “logic” is in step with such
a model of reasoning (for an overview on logic in history: Blanché and
Dubucs, 1996; Varzi et al., 2004).
We usually say that something is “logical” either when it is strongly
linked to one or more premises, or when it is part of an ordered scheme.
In the former sense we admit for instance that having determined that
all black birds are (named) ravens, if we find a black bird it must logical-
ly be (named as) a raven; in the latter sense we can, for instance, say that
just because yesterday was Monday today must logically be Tuesday, hav-
ing previously established (or accepted) a scheme of consequence about
the series of the (names of the) days. In other words, “logic” means that a
certain conclusion – (the name) raven or (the name) Tuesday – is obliga-
tory because some premises have been established or at least accepted by
participants in the discourse.
The formula of such an argument can be expressed in the most gen-
eral terms as if P then Q. It implies (at least) that:
1. one or more premises (P) do exist in the discourse before the argu-
ment;
2. this or these premises are clearly understood as P and not as other
than P by participants in the discourse;
3. this or these premises are accepted by participants in the discourse;
4. one and only one connection can be found between P and Q, avoid-
ing arguments like if P then Q or other then Q.
From the modern point of view (the one of Montesquieu and Becca-
ria) argument if P then Q can be guaranteed by the immutability of the
premises (P = P) according to the basic principle of identity. We must
imagine a closed circle of reasoning in which all possible Qs (such as ra-
ven or Tuesday) are ab initio part of the genre P (such as black birds or
and arbitrariness, whereas citizens have the right to know exactly what
to do or not to do and what consequences they risk in doing or not do-
ing something (Beccaria, 1982; Montesquieu, 1994). According to such
a conviction, the right thing would be to have clear and durable written
norms, similar to the axioms of the formal sciences and established by an
effective authority (the souverain: a king or a parliament). With norms
like these, the judge’s task would consist exclusively in recognizing when
a fact is relevant as a species of the normative genus: a truly logical oper-
ation of “deduction” from a general and unambiguous list of obligatory
behaviours and sanctions. This is the so-called “legal syllogism” which I
am going to describe in more detail in this article. But for the moment
let us pause a moment, and ask what idea of “logic” is in step with such
a model of reasoning (for an overview on logic in history: Blanché and
Dubucs, 1996; Varzi et al., 2004).
We usually say that something is “logical” either when it is strongly
linked to one or more premises, or when it is part of an ordered scheme.
In the former sense we admit for instance that having determined that
all black birds are (named) ravens, if we find a black bird it must logical-
ly be (named as) a raven; in the latter sense we can, for instance, say that
just because yesterday was Monday today must logically be Tuesday, hav-
ing previously established (or accepted) a scheme of consequence about
the series of the (names of the) days. In other words, “logic” means that a
certain conclusion – (the name) raven or (the name) Tuesday – is obliga-
tory because some premises have been established or at least accepted by
participants in the discourse.
The formula of such an argument can be expressed in the most gen-
eral terms as if P then Q. It implies (at least) that:
1. one or more premises (P) do exist in the discourse before the argu-
ment;
2. this or these premises are clearly understood as P and not as other
than P by participants in the discourse;
3. this or these premises are accepted by participants in the discourse;
4. one and only one connection can be found between P and Q, avoid-
ing arguments like if P then Q or other then Q.
From the modern point of view (the one of Montesquieu and Becca-
ria) argument if P then Q can be guaranteed by the immutability of the
premises (P = P) according to the basic principle of identity. We must
imagine a closed circle of reasoning in which all possible Qs (such as ra-
ven or Tuesday) are ab initio part of the genre P (such as black birds or
