Page 20 - Oswald Ducrot, Slovenian Lectures, Digitalna knjižnica/Digital Library, Dissertationes 6
P. 20
Slovenian Lectures
So, I am going to speak about Searle’s systematization of Austin’s concep-
tions. Searle tells us that two things must be distinguished in the meaning of
any utterance. One, which he calls the propositional content, is a description
of reality, which can be either true or false and which therefore must be de-
scribed in truth-conditional terms, in terms of true and false. Then there is
another part, which he calls an illocutionary force, which is applied to that
propositional content. The illocutionary force is a certain type of speech-act.
To go back to my examples: should he describe an utterance like “Peter will
come”, Searle would say there is a propositional content which is exactly the
same as Bally’s or the Port-Royal grammarians’ dictum: that is, the idea of Pe-
ter’s coming in the future, a content which can be either true or false. For the
illocutionary force, Searle would not specify a belief but a type of act: the act
here is the act of affirmation. Were you to take the second utterance “May Pe-
ter come!”, you would have the same propositional content but a different il-
locutionary force: you would have another type of speech-act, the act of or-
dering for example. In saying “May Peter come!”, you perform the act of or-
dering, which is associated with the illocutionary force of the utterance, in
connection with a certain propositional content, that is Peter’s future com-
ing. You see the difference between that conception and Bally’s or the Port-
Royal grammarians’. In Searle’s conception, the active, subjective aspect of
meaning is no longer a description of the speaker’s attitude. It is made up of
the act which the speaker performs or, in my view, makes himself out to be
performing as he speaks. When I affirm that Peter will come, I am not in-
forming you on my beliefs: I assume a certain responsibility regarding Peter’s
future coming. Once I have said “Peter will come”, I must be ready to give you
reasons justifying my affirmation, I must be ready to admit that I made a mis-
take should it appear that, in fact, Peter is not coming. The force thus consists
in an obligation which the speaker places himself under. The same goes for an
order: when I say “May Peter come!” to you, I am not telling you that I desire
his coming to be the case but I am performing an order, that is to say that I am
making you out to be placed under the obligation of making Peter come, or
else, possibly, making Peter out to be placed under the obligation of coming.
That is, I make out a certain person to be placed under a certain obligation.
The fact of placing, of making someone out to be placed under a certain obli-
gation is something altogether different from the representation of a psycho-
logical desire: I have perhaps absolutely no desire for Peter to come, but even
so I can give the order “May Peter come!”
In speech-act philosophy then, there is a criticism of the descriptive,
representational, informative conception of meaning, which is beginning
So, I am going to speak about Searle’s systematization of Austin’s concep-
tions. Searle tells us that two things must be distinguished in the meaning of
any utterance. One, which he calls the propositional content, is a description
of reality, which can be either true or false and which therefore must be de-
scribed in truth-conditional terms, in terms of true and false. Then there is
another part, which he calls an illocutionary force, which is applied to that
propositional content. The illocutionary force is a certain type of speech-act.
To go back to my examples: should he describe an utterance like “Peter will
come”, Searle would say there is a propositional content which is exactly the
same as Bally’s or the Port-Royal grammarians’ dictum: that is, the idea of Pe-
ter’s coming in the future, a content which can be either true or false. For the
illocutionary force, Searle would not specify a belief but a type of act: the act
here is the act of affirmation. Were you to take the second utterance “May Pe-
ter come!”, you would have the same propositional content but a different il-
locutionary force: you would have another type of speech-act, the act of or-
dering for example. In saying “May Peter come!”, you perform the act of or-
dering, which is associated with the illocutionary force of the utterance, in
connection with a certain propositional content, that is Peter’s future com-
ing. You see the difference between that conception and Bally’s or the Port-
Royal grammarians’. In Searle’s conception, the active, subjective aspect of
meaning is no longer a description of the speaker’s attitude. It is made up of
the act which the speaker performs or, in my view, makes himself out to be
performing as he speaks. When I affirm that Peter will come, I am not in-
forming you on my beliefs: I assume a certain responsibility regarding Peter’s
future coming. Once I have said “Peter will come”, I must be ready to give you
reasons justifying my affirmation, I must be ready to admit that I made a mis-
take should it appear that, in fact, Peter is not coming. The force thus consists
in an obligation which the speaker places himself under. The same goes for an
order: when I say “May Peter come!” to you, I am not telling you that I desire
his coming to be the case but I am performing an order, that is to say that I am
making you out to be placed under the obligation of making Peter come, or
else, possibly, making Peter out to be placed under the obligation of coming.
That is, I make out a certain person to be placed under a certain obligation.
The fact of placing, of making someone out to be placed under a certain obli-
gation is something altogether different from the representation of a psycho-
logical desire: I have perhaps absolutely no desire for Peter to come, but even
so I can give the order “May Peter come!”
In speech-act philosophy then, there is a criticism of the descriptive,
representational, informative conception of meaning, which is beginning
