Page 16 - Oswald Ducrot, Slovenian Lectures, Digitalna knjižnica/Digital Library, Dissertationes 6
P. 16
Slovenian Lectures
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First, I will quickly try to describe that conception of meaning through
which language represents itself and which, according to me, if accepted,
should indeed lead semanticians to commit suicide. That conception of
meaning inherent in the word mean and inherent in the usual representa-
tion of the standard use of language, I will call the informative or descrip-
tive conception of meaning. More precisely, what I will try to do is to de-
velop a conception of meaning which is not informative or descriptive. So,
what does that informative or descriptive conception of meaning consist
in? It consists in saying that the first function of speech or discourse is to
convey an image of reality, to provide information on whatever happens to
be the case.
Let us try to consider that a little more closely. Why can the words we
use when we speak give information on reality? I think that to answer that
question, you must have recourse to a distinction which, to my mind, is an
essential one: the distinction between what I call sentences and utterances.
What I mean by a sentence is a linguistic entity: a sentence is an element in
a given language-system itself. A language-system makes it possible to con-
struct sentences by combining words in a certain way. When we speak, we
use sentences but under the form of what I call utterances. To take a very
commonplace example, let us suppose that having already said “It’s warm”, I
repeat “It’s warm”. What you have is two different utterances, each of which
has been produced at a particular moment of time (at an interval of a few
seconds); but those two different utterances, “It’s warm” and “It’s warm” are
utterances of the same English sentence It’s warm, the structure of which
is unique. So, a language-system provides a certain set of sentences and
then the speaker uses those sentences in the form of utterances. Thus, that
unique English sentence It’s warm is used millions and millions of times.
Now, having made that distinction, I will return to the main point,
which, I remind you, is to describe the informative or descriptive concep-
tion of meaning. That conception consists in thinking that the fundamen-
tal value of a sentence consists in its truth-conditions. To describe the Eng-
lish sentence It’s warm is to say under which conditions it is true and under
which it is false; it is to say how the world must be for that sentence to be
true. Similarly, to describe the English sentence Peter is intelligent is to say
what Peter must be for you to claim truthfully that he is intelligent. So, to
describe a sentence under that conception of meaning is to give the truth-
conditions for the use of that sentence. Given that conception, that utter-
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First, I will quickly try to describe that conception of meaning through
which language represents itself and which, according to me, if accepted,
should indeed lead semanticians to commit suicide. That conception of
meaning inherent in the word mean and inherent in the usual representa-
tion of the standard use of language, I will call the informative or descrip-
tive conception of meaning. More precisely, what I will try to do is to de-
velop a conception of meaning which is not informative or descriptive. So,
what does that informative or descriptive conception of meaning consist
in? It consists in saying that the first function of speech or discourse is to
convey an image of reality, to provide information on whatever happens to
be the case.
Let us try to consider that a little more closely. Why can the words we
use when we speak give information on reality? I think that to answer that
question, you must have recourse to a distinction which, to my mind, is an
essential one: the distinction between what I call sentences and utterances.
What I mean by a sentence is a linguistic entity: a sentence is an element in
a given language-system itself. A language-system makes it possible to con-
struct sentences by combining words in a certain way. When we speak, we
use sentences but under the form of what I call utterances. To take a very
commonplace example, let us suppose that having already said “It’s warm”, I
repeat “It’s warm”. What you have is two different utterances, each of which
has been produced at a particular moment of time (at an interval of a few
seconds); but those two different utterances, “It’s warm” and “It’s warm” are
utterances of the same English sentence It’s warm, the structure of which
is unique. So, a language-system provides a certain set of sentences and
then the speaker uses those sentences in the form of utterances. Thus, that
unique English sentence It’s warm is used millions and millions of times.
Now, having made that distinction, I will return to the main point,
which, I remind you, is to describe the informative or descriptive concep-
tion of meaning. That conception consists in thinking that the fundamen-
tal value of a sentence consists in its truth-conditions. To describe the Eng-
lish sentence It’s warm is to say under which conditions it is true and under
which it is false; it is to say how the world must be for that sentence to be
true. Similarly, to describe the English sentence Peter is intelligent is to say
what Peter must be for you to claim truthfully that he is intelligent. So, to
describe a sentence under that conception of meaning is to give the truth-
conditions for the use of that sentence. Given that conception, that utter-
