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u. boljka et al. ■ who calls the shots? the insiders and outsiders ...
broader terms, namely at the level of the social system. He argues for a just
society which must ensure the distribution of primary goods (such as free-
dom and opportunity, income, wealth and the basis of self-esteem), and
social institutions (e.g. legal protection of freedom of thought and free-
dom of conscience, competitive markets, private ownership of productive
assets, a monogamous family) which (if provided) ensure a just society.
Although Rawls (1971) does not pay much attention to education, the ed-
ucation system can surely be considered as one social institution whose
practices influence the distribution of the individual’s opportunities. As
such, Rawls’ ideas also find their place in academic attempts to assess the
fairness of education systems on the systemic level as well as the micro lev-
el (for instance, assessing the practices of teachers) (Kodelja, 2006).
The basis of Rawls’ (1971) formulation of justice lies in a special con-
ception of justice; namely, justice as fairness whose two underlying princi-
ples ensure a just and moral society:
1. The Greatest Equal Liberty Principle. Each person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liber-
ties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. The latter re-
lates mainly to a range of primary social goods required to obtain
the status of a free and equal citizen therefore ensuring the inclusion
into mutually cooperating society throughout the individual’s life.
This principle does not, however, relate to natural primary goods
such as health, intelligence, natural talents, etc. (Van Parijs, 2003,
pp. 210–211)
The second principle argues that, despite inequalities forming part
of the society, a society may be considered to be just if such inequalities are
arranged in line with:
2. The Difference Principle. This means that the social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the
just savings principle; and
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls, 1971, pp. 302–303)
The principles are arranged in such a way as to give lexical priority
for 1 over 2(b) and 2(a). In building a just society, Rawls (1971) is primar-
ily interested in how to improve the initial opportunities of individuals
and not whether the maximisation of opportunities results in more equal
outcomes for these individuals. The subject of legitimate redistribution4 is
4 The obstacles people may face and could be subject to equalisation attempts by the state
83
broader terms, namely at the level of the social system. He argues for a just
society which must ensure the distribution of primary goods (such as free-
dom and opportunity, income, wealth and the basis of self-esteem), and
social institutions (e.g. legal protection of freedom of thought and free-
dom of conscience, competitive markets, private ownership of productive
assets, a monogamous family) which (if provided) ensure a just society.
Although Rawls (1971) does not pay much attention to education, the ed-
ucation system can surely be considered as one social institution whose
practices influence the distribution of the individual’s opportunities. As
such, Rawls’ ideas also find their place in academic attempts to assess the
fairness of education systems on the systemic level as well as the micro lev-
el (for instance, assessing the practices of teachers) (Kodelja, 2006).
The basis of Rawls’ (1971) formulation of justice lies in a special con-
ception of justice; namely, justice as fairness whose two underlying princi-
ples ensure a just and moral society:
1. The Greatest Equal Liberty Principle. Each person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liber-
ties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. The latter re-
lates mainly to a range of primary social goods required to obtain
the status of a free and equal citizen therefore ensuring the inclusion
into mutually cooperating society throughout the individual’s life.
This principle does not, however, relate to natural primary goods
such as health, intelligence, natural talents, etc. (Van Parijs, 2003,
pp. 210–211)
The second principle argues that, despite inequalities forming part
of the society, a society may be considered to be just if such inequalities are
arranged in line with:
2. The Difference Principle. This means that the social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the
just savings principle; and
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls, 1971, pp. 302–303)
The principles are arranged in such a way as to give lexical priority
for 1 over 2(b) and 2(a). In building a just society, Rawls (1971) is primar-
ily interested in how to improve the initial opportunities of individuals
and not whether the maximisation of opportunities results in more equal
outcomes for these individuals. The subject of legitimate redistribution4 is
4 The obstacles people may face and could be subject to equalisation attempts by the state
83
