Page 55 - Šolsko polje, XXXI, 2020, 3-4: Convention on the Rights of the Child: Educational Opportunities and Social Justice, eds. Zdenko Kodelja and Urška Štremfel
P. 55
j. vranješevič ■ convention on the rights of the child and adultism ...
their own point of view. From socio-constructivists’ perspective, this ar-
gument that children are passive recipients of environmental influences
is untenable; rather, children actively learn and design the world around
them in cooperation with adults. The age and competencies of children
cannot be the argument for not listening to them, especially in the pe-
riod of middle childhood and adolescence since this is the period when
important competencies for complex forms of participation develop
(Lansdown, 2005; Vranješević, 2004). However, despite the arguments in
favour of children’s competence to participate in defining their own best
interest, the practice of avoiding consulting with children and one-sided
adults’ definition of what is the best for the child are still dominant char-
acteristics of adults’ attitude. The reason for this should be sought in the
complex relationship between participation and the best interest of chil-
dren because in the majority of cases the possibilities of the child’s partic-
ipation are not only limited by the assessment of child’s (in)competence
but by the adults’ care for the child’s benefits and protection from all pos-
sible negative consequences of particular choices. Some research shows
that the most frequent reason given against child’s participation in the
decision-making process is related to the child’s best interest, as perceived
by the adults (Vranješević, 2012), such that the basic question about the
child’s care is how to make an informed decision in the best interest of the
child and simultaneously protect the child from the stress that is imma-
nent to the decision-making process. Moreover, studies show that even if
adults consider children as capable of assessing their best interest, they do
not consider that competence as important (Vranješević, 2012). Typically,
the practice used as a basis for resolving the dilemma between participa-
tion, the child’s competence and the best interest of the child is problemat-
ic from the perspective of both the competence assessment and the child’s
best interest. If an adult believes that the child’s decision is not in his/her
best interest, the adult will most probably conclude that the child is in-
competent, unable to decide. Therefore, whenever children use criteria de-
cision different to the adults’ criteria the adults assume that child’s crite-
ria are developmentally less valuable than theirs. In assessing the child’s
competence, adults are often in a dual role: it often happens that the same
adults in charge of assessing the child’s competence for participation are
also in charge of deciding what would be the child’s best interest, i.e. to
what extent the child will participate in the decision-making process.
Since the standards for competence assessment are significantly
higher in situations when the decisions could bring risky consequences,
one may conclude that the same child could be assessed as competent in
situations of low risk and incompetent in a situation of high risk. Keeping
53
their own point of view. From socio-constructivists’ perspective, this ar-
gument that children are passive recipients of environmental influences
is untenable; rather, children actively learn and design the world around
them in cooperation with adults. The age and competencies of children
cannot be the argument for not listening to them, especially in the pe-
riod of middle childhood and adolescence since this is the period when
important competencies for complex forms of participation develop
(Lansdown, 2005; Vranješević, 2004). However, despite the arguments in
favour of children’s competence to participate in defining their own best
interest, the practice of avoiding consulting with children and one-sided
adults’ definition of what is the best for the child are still dominant char-
acteristics of adults’ attitude. The reason for this should be sought in the
complex relationship between participation and the best interest of chil-
dren because in the majority of cases the possibilities of the child’s partic-
ipation are not only limited by the assessment of child’s (in)competence
but by the adults’ care for the child’s benefits and protection from all pos-
sible negative consequences of particular choices. Some research shows
that the most frequent reason given against child’s participation in the
decision-making process is related to the child’s best interest, as perceived
by the adults (Vranješević, 2012), such that the basic question about the
child’s care is how to make an informed decision in the best interest of the
child and simultaneously protect the child from the stress that is imma-
nent to the decision-making process. Moreover, studies show that even if
adults consider children as capable of assessing their best interest, they do
not consider that competence as important (Vranješević, 2012). Typically,
the practice used as a basis for resolving the dilemma between participa-
tion, the child’s competence and the best interest of the child is problemat-
ic from the perspective of both the competence assessment and the child’s
best interest. If an adult believes that the child’s decision is not in his/her
best interest, the adult will most probably conclude that the child is in-
competent, unable to decide. Therefore, whenever children use criteria de-
cision different to the adults’ criteria the adults assume that child’s crite-
ria are developmentally less valuable than theirs. In assessing the child’s
competence, adults are often in a dual role: it often happens that the same
adults in charge of assessing the child’s competence for participation are
also in charge of deciding what would be the child’s best interest, i.e. to
what extent the child will participate in the decision-making process.
Since the standards for competence assessment are significantly
higher in situations when the decisions could bring risky consequences,
one may conclude that the same child could be assessed as competent in
situations of low risk and incompetent in a situation of high risk. Keeping
53
