Page 65 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
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fallacies: do we ‘use’ them or ‘commit’ them? ...
43 is that nothing can cost anything
44 S1: yes
45 H: eastern enlargement costs money
46 S1: yes yes (Wodak ibid.: 141–142)
Again, it is completely unclear where and what the fallacy of hasty gen-
eralization should be. There are (only) two possible candidates, ‘the only
thing (that makes sense) ...’ or ‘hollow skulls’. But it is hard to understand
why these two should be fallacies: ‘the only thing (that makes sense ...)’ is
(or at least could be) an amplification or hyperbole, a rather standard(ized)
rhetorical device we use for emphasizing. While the ‘hollow skulls’ is clear-
ly a metaphor (or a metonymy in certain interpretations), serving the same
purpose as hyperbole at the beginning of the turn, but hardly a fallacy—
unless every trope is a potential fallacy, of course. And even if every poten-
tial trope would be a potential fallacy, the hollow European skulls would be
more of a candidate for a Straw-man fallacy or even Ad Hominem, not a fal-
lacy of Hasty Generalization.
We could go on with many more examples from Wodak’s book, but
they are all repeating the same pattern described. A tentative conclusion
may therefore be in order.
Conclusion: back to Austin and Hamblin
I would like to conclude in the same way I started, with Austin and Hamblin.
After pointing out that the reference depends on the knowledge at the time
of utterance, Austin emphasizes:
It is essential to realize that ‘true’ and ‘false’, like ‘free’ and ‘un-
free’, do not stand for anything simple at all; but only for a gener-
al dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to
a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these
purposes and with these intentions. In general we may say this:
with both statements (and, for example, descriptions) and warn-
ings, &c., the question can arise, granting that you had the right
to warn and did warn, did state, or did advise, whether you were
right to state or warn or advise—not in the sense of whether it was
opportune or expedient, but whether, on the facts and your knowl-
edge of the facts and the purposes for which you were speaking, and
so on, this was the proper thing to say. (Austin ibid.: 144–145)
65
43 is that nothing can cost anything
44 S1: yes
45 H: eastern enlargement costs money
46 S1: yes yes (Wodak ibid.: 141–142)
Again, it is completely unclear where and what the fallacy of hasty gen-
eralization should be. There are (only) two possible candidates, ‘the only
thing (that makes sense) ...’ or ‘hollow skulls’. But it is hard to understand
why these two should be fallacies: ‘the only thing (that makes sense ...)’ is
(or at least could be) an amplification or hyperbole, a rather standard(ized)
rhetorical device we use for emphasizing. While the ‘hollow skulls’ is clear-
ly a metaphor (or a metonymy in certain interpretations), serving the same
purpose as hyperbole at the beginning of the turn, but hardly a fallacy—
unless every trope is a potential fallacy, of course. And even if every poten-
tial trope would be a potential fallacy, the hollow European skulls would be
more of a candidate for a Straw-man fallacy or even Ad Hominem, not a fal-
lacy of Hasty Generalization.
We could go on with many more examples from Wodak’s book, but
they are all repeating the same pattern described. A tentative conclusion
may therefore be in order.
Conclusion: back to Austin and Hamblin
I would like to conclude in the same way I started, with Austin and Hamblin.
After pointing out that the reference depends on the knowledge at the time
of utterance, Austin emphasizes:
It is essential to realize that ‘true’ and ‘false’, like ‘free’ and ‘un-
free’, do not stand for anything simple at all; but only for a gener-
al dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to
a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these
purposes and with these intentions. In general we may say this:
with both statements (and, for example, descriptions) and warn-
ings, &c., the question can arise, granting that you had the right
to warn and did warn, did state, or did advise, whether you were
right to state or warn or advise—not in the sense of whether it was
opportune or expedient, but whether, on the facts and your knowl-
edge of the facts and the purposes for which you were speaking, and
so on, this was the proper thing to say. (Austin ibid.: 144–145)
65
