Page 26 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
P. 26
four critical essays on argumentation
it becomes pretty obvious that Aristotle derived his common topics from
his categories. While categories represent the most general, and basic, rela-
tions between different entities in the world, and are, therefore, metaphysi-
cal in nature, the common topics (i.e. topoi) represent the most general, and
basic, relations between concepts, notions, or words representing or denot-
ing these different entities in the world. That is why Aristotle could pres-
ent them as a ‘list’ (though it really was not a list in the sense DHA is using
the term): because they were so very general, so very basic, that they could
have been used in every act of speech or writing. This is not the case with
the DHA lists of topoi we have been discussing above: their topoi cannot
be used in just any situation, but in rather particular situations, especially
the topoi ‘identified’ by Krzyzanowski. They could be classified not as com-
mon topoi, but more likely as specific topoi, something Aristotle called idia,
which could be roughly translated as ‘what is proper to...’, ‘what belongs
to...’. Also, this ‘list’ of Aristotle’s common topoi was not there for possible
or prospective authors ‘to check their arguments against it’. This ‘list’ was
there for general use, offering a stock of possible and potential common to-
poi for possible and potential future arguments and speeches.
Some basic definitions
Here is a short schematic and simplified overview of how Aristotle defines
the mechanics and the functioning of topoi and their parts in his Topics, a
work that preceded Rhetoric. We have to start with a few definitions.
Problems—what is at stake, what is being discussed—are expressed
by propositions. Every proposition consists of a subject and predicate(s) that
belong(s) to the subject. These predicates, usually referred to as predicables,
are of four kinds: definition, genus, property and accident:
Definition is a phrase indicating the essence of something. (T. I. v.
39–40)
A genus is that which is predicated in the category of essence of
several things which differ in kind. (T. I. v. 32–33)
A property is something which does not show the essence of a
thing but belongs to it alone and is predicated convertibly of it. (T.
I. v. 19–21)
An accident is that which is none of these things ... but still be-
longs to the thing. (T. I. v. 4–6)
26
it becomes pretty obvious that Aristotle derived his common topics from
his categories. While categories represent the most general, and basic, rela-
tions between different entities in the world, and are, therefore, metaphysi-
cal in nature, the common topics (i.e. topoi) represent the most general, and
basic, relations between concepts, notions, or words representing or denot-
ing these different entities in the world. That is why Aristotle could pres-
ent them as a ‘list’ (though it really was not a list in the sense DHA is using
the term): because they were so very general, so very basic, that they could
have been used in every act of speech or writing. This is not the case with
the DHA lists of topoi we have been discussing above: their topoi cannot
be used in just any situation, but in rather particular situations, especially
the topoi ‘identified’ by Krzyzanowski. They could be classified not as com-
mon topoi, but more likely as specific topoi, something Aristotle called idia,
which could be roughly translated as ‘what is proper to...’, ‘what belongs
to...’. Also, this ‘list’ of Aristotle’s common topoi was not there for possible
or prospective authors ‘to check their arguments against it’. This ‘list’ was
there for general use, offering a stock of possible and potential common to-
poi for possible and potential future arguments and speeches.
Some basic definitions
Here is a short schematic and simplified overview of how Aristotle defines
the mechanics and the functioning of topoi and their parts in his Topics, a
work that preceded Rhetoric. We have to start with a few definitions.
Problems—what is at stake, what is being discussed—are expressed
by propositions. Every proposition consists of a subject and predicate(s) that
belong(s) to the subject. These predicates, usually referred to as predicables,
are of four kinds: definition, genus, property and accident:
Definition is a phrase indicating the essence of something. (T. I. v.
39–40)
A genus is that which is predicated in the category of essence of
several things which differ in kind. (T. I. v. 32–33)
A property is something which does not show the essence of a
thing but belongs to it alone and is predicated convertibly of it. (T.
I. v. 19–21)
An accident is that which is none of these things ... but still be-
longs to the thing. (T. I. v. 4–6)
26
