Page 31 - Darko Štrajn, From Walter Benjamin to the End of Cinema: Identities, Illusion and Signification. Ljubljana: Educational Research Institute, 2017. Digital Library, Dissertationes, 29.
P. 31
benjamin‘s aspect
ery may seem (though in the final analysis it is not so simple at all), it hap-
pened as a finally uttered knowledge of the fact, which had been repressed
by the dominant “class culture.” In addition, probably it is not just a coinci-
dence that Benjamin named this “fact” vaguely the aura, which as a notion
gets its meaning through the process of disappearing. The aura is, by vir-
tue of being something through non-existence, in a full sense of the word,
a dialectical notion, which marks a profound change in the symbolic or-
der of things. Aesthetic objects certainly occupy a distinguished place in
this order. Nevertheless, as Benjamin found out, their aura secured a spe-
cial sphere of the effectiveness of their symbolic power. They were a part of
an order of the especially divided social imaginary, which continues to be
active long after the mechanical reproduction has taken place. The disap-
pearing of the aura through the intrusion of the reproduction of the classic
works of art, and even more significantly, through the development of the
new forms of art, made possible by technical devices, brings a turn into the
function of the art itself. Characteristically, these “new forms of art” were
dismissed by the privileged public as cheap entertainment for the unedu-
cated.
Let me now look at the problem of what happens with the form. The
aesthetic views elaborated in the beginning of the early modern age (nota-
bly within the German philosophy and the movement of romanticism) in
general developed the concept of the form in accordance with a notion of
the Subject. To put it briefly, subjectivity has been perceived as being in-
scribed into the difference, which is brought to existence by the form. Al-
though Benjamin does not say so, subjectivity has been seen as a constitu-
ent of the aura, participating in the divine and even replacing it. Aura at the
same time marked the subjectivity’s attributes of singularity. In some in-
stances the aura (or whichever expression representing it) marked the sub-
jectivity as even the replacement of a divinity. Of course, the problem of the
form is much easier explained in the case of classic visual arts, paintings
and sculptures than in the case of narrative arts. In confrontation with the
problem of the content, the construction of the certain rules created paths
for the sensation of beauty. But all the time there was no doubt that the aes-
thetic creation belongs to so-called nobler human activities, and that it is in
possession of the “higher” truth, and there was no doubt that enjoyment of
the preciousness of the works of art requires an adequate education, espe-
cially for the purpose of perceiving the sublime qualities of different forms.
One may object, saying this is an oversimplification, but such an objection
29
ery may seem (though in the final analysis it is not so simple at all), it hap-
pened as a finally uttered knowledge of the fact, which had been repressed
by the dominant “class culture.” In addition, probably it is not just a coinci-
dence that Benjamin named this “fact” vaguely the aura, which as a notion
gets its meaning through the process of disappearing. The aura is, by vir-
tue of being something through non-existence, in a full sense of the word,
a dialectical notion, which marks a profound change in the symbolic or-
der of things. Aesthetic objects certainly occupy a distinguished place in
this order. Nevertheless, as Benjamin found out, their aura secured a spe-
cial sphere of the effectiveness of their symbolic power. They were a part of
an order of the especially divided social imaginary, which continues to be
active long after the mechanical reproduction has taken place. The disap-
pearing of the aura through the intrusion of the reproduction of the classic
works of art, and even more significantly, through the development of the
new forms of art, made possible by technical devices, brings a turn into the
function of the art itself. Characteristically, these “new forms of art” were
dismissed by the privileged public as cheap entertainment for the unedu-
cated.
Let me now look at the problem of what happens with the form. The
aesthetic views elaborated in the beginning of the early modern age (nota-
bly within the German philosophy and the movement of romanticism) in
general developed the concept of the form in accordance with a notion of
the Subject. To put it briefly, subjectivity has been perceived as being in-
scribed into the difference, which is brought to existence by the form. Al-
though Benjamin does not say so, subjectivity has been seen as a constitu-
ent of the aura, participating in the divine and even replacing it. Aura at the
same time marked the subjectivity’s attributes of singularity. In some in-
stances the aura (or whichever expression representing it) marked the sub-
jectivity as even the replacement of a divinity. Of course, the problem of the
form is much easier explained in the case of classic visual arts, paintings
and sculptures than in the case of narrative arts. In confrontation with the
problem of the content, the construction of the certain rules created paths
for the sensation of beauty. But all the time there was no doubt that the aes-
thetic creation belongs to so-called nobler human activities, and that it is in
possession of the “higher” truth, and there was no doubt that enjoyment of
the preciousness of the works of art requires an adequate education, espe-
cially for the purpose of perceiving the sublime qualities of different forms.
One may object, saying this is an oversimplification, but such an objection
29
