Page 205 - Darko Štrajn, From Walter Benjamin to the End of Cinema: Identities, Illusion and Signification. Ljubljana: Educational Research Institute, 2017. Digital Library, Dissertationes, 29.
P. 205
summary
by virtue of being something through non-existence, in a full sense of the
word, a dialectical notion, which marks a profound change in the symbol-
ic order of things. Aesthetic objects certainly occupy a distinguished place
in this order. As Benjamin found out, their aura secured a special sphere
of the effectiveness of their symbolic power. They were a part of an order of
the especially divided social imaginary, which continues to be active long
after the mechanical reproduction has taken place. The disappearing of the
aura through the intrusion of the reproduction of the classic works of art,
and even more significantly, through the development of the new forms of
art, made possible by technical devices, brings a turn into the function of
the art itself. Characteristically, these “new forms of art” were dismissed by
the privileged public as cheap entertainment for the uneducated. Howev-
er, entering mass perception, the new forms of aesthetic praxis overturn the
whole functioning of the arts in the social imaginary. Although discussing
the problems of the form of the aesthetic objects, the products of “techno-
logical” arts included, may still be a “noble” task of aesthetic theory, there
is no doubt that Benjamin’s observations assert that the aesthetic produc-
tion interferes with the reproduction of the society in a much more deci-
sive way than anybody has ever imagined or dreamt before the emergence
of the mechanical reproduction. (Maybe today we could widen the number
of synonymous adjectives, beside “mechanical,” i.e. “electronically”, “mul-
timediatically” and so on.) In the industrial age, the recognition of the form
became in a broad sense simply functional, and everybody has been trained
to recognize forms automatically by being exposed to almost continuous
and often unwanted influence of images, sounds, signs and designs. There
is no way to sell new “contents” in approved forms. The public – or the con-
sumers – must be shocked into perceiving the difference, which is nothing
else but the form.
The cultural ideology that probably serves well to what is increasing-
ly labelled as the “tourism industry” – and one cannot really blame it too
much for this – can be comprehended as a sanctuary for everything from
artists’ narcissism to what is considered the “taste”. This supposedly distin-
guishes class from masses, high from lowbrow, the West from the rest, and
“us” from “them”. This ideology is quite transparently based on a projec-
tion into the past, in which a construction of a world, in which “true val-
ues” were respected, is the central invented idea. As we know this imagi-
nary world of “true art” is attached to the time of romanticism, which is
also the time of the peak of aesthetics as a philosophic discipline. As Berg-
203
by virtue of being something through non-existence, in a full sense of the
word, a dialectical notion, which marks a profound change in the symbol-
ic order of things. Aesthetic objects certainly occupy a distinguished place
in this order. As Benjamin found out, their aura secured a special sphere
of the effectiveness of their symbolic power. They were a part of an order of
the especially divided social imaginary, which continues to be active long
after the mechanical reproduction has taken place. The disappearing of the
aura through the intrusion of the reproduction of the classic works of art,
and even more significantly, through the development of the new forms of
art, made possible by technical devices, brings a turn into the function of
the art itself. Characteristically, these “new forms of art” were dismissed by
the privileged public as cheap entertainment for the uneducated. Howev-
er, entering mass perception, the new forms of aesthetic praxis overturn the
whole functioning of the arts in the social imaginary. Although discussing
the problems of the form of the aesthetic objects, the products of “techno-
logical” arts included, may still be a “noble” task of aesthetic theory, there
is no doubt that Benjamin’s observations assert that the aesthetic produc-
tion interferes with the reproduction of the society in a much more deci-
sive way than anybody has ever imagined or dreamt before the emergence
of the mechanical reproduction. (Maybe today we could widen the number
of synonymous adjectives, beside “mechanical,” i.e. “electronically”, “mul-
timediatically” and so on.) In the industrial age, the recognition of the form
became in a broad sense simply functional, and everybody has been trained
to recognize forms automatically by being exposed to almost continuous
and often unwanted influence of images, sounds, signs and designs. There
is no way to sell new “contents” in approved forms. The public – or the con-
sumers – must be shocked into perceiving the difference, which is nothing
else but the form.
The cultural ideology that probably serves well to what is increasing-
ly labelled as the “tourism industry” – and one cannot really blame it too
much for this – can be comprehended as a sanctuary for everything from
artists’ narcissism to what is considered the “taste”. This supposedly distin-
guishes class from masses, high from lowbrow, the West from the rest, and
“us” from “them”. This ideology is quite transparently based on a projec-
tion into the past, in which a construction of a world, in which “true val-
ues” were respected, is the central invented idea. As we know this imagi-
nary world of “true art” is attached to the time of romanticism, which is
also the time of the peak of aesthetics as a philosophic discipline. As Berg-
203
