Page 194 - Darko Štrajn, From Walter Benjamin to the End of Cinema: Identities, Illusion and Signification. Ljubljana: Educational Research Institute, 2017. Digital Library, Dissertationes, 29.
P. 194
from walter benjamin to the end of cinema
ines Terrence Malick‘s film Days of Heaven (1978), he emphases the notion
of beauty.
Although venerable traditional aesthetic considerations on beauty
seem mostly obsolete, the concept of beauty cannot be simply discarded
considering that it is inscribed in the foundation of the very idea of all aes-
thetics. The cinematic reality, always one way or the other related to a per-
ception of beauty (or, as it were, its contrast) of images, therefore, cannot
be conceived without aesthetics, which in case of cinema transgresses the
boundaries of “just” art. Elsaesser and Hagener ascertained and anticipat-
ed in their clarification that “/…/ the cinema seems poised to leave behind
its function as a ‘medium’ (for the representation of reality) in order to be-
come a ‘life form‘ (and thus a reality in its own right)” (Elsaesser, Hage-
ner, 2010: 12). In a self-reflective turn (meaning cinema theory as the sub-
ject) they proceed with their argument, based on the assumption that film
theory “put the body and the senses at the centre” of its interest in the di-
rection, which in the age of ubiquitous digital communication does not
seem far-fetched anymore. They point out that the cinema is proposing to
us “/…/ besides a new way of knowing the world, also a new way of ‘being
in the world’, and thus demanding from film theory, next to a new episte-
mology also a new ontology‘” (Ibid.). On a “technical” level of descriptions
of what is going on, in both epistemology and ontology, film theory has to
deal with vibrant changes. For instance: once the theory made up its mind
and accepted DVD as the new medium, this “medium” or “material carri-
er” became much less important than video streaming through broad band
internet channels to a growing number of devices with HD screens. “On-
tology”, therefore, keeps having problems in its postulates on anything ob-
jective or constant in the “third nature”, which follows what Adorno and
Horkheimer à l’époque named the “second nature” within the industri-
al society. Obviously, we are living in the Lacanian reality of floating sig-
nifiers, compelled to give-up any hope to be able to construct a notion of
reality, which in Badiouan terms keeps being subverted by incursions of
“the real”. Of course, there are intellectual and simply nostalgic backlash-
es. Against the “growing popularity of Web and cell phone cinema” there
are strong opposing opinions: “Indeed, the rise of new media has brought
with it an increase in academic protection of the sacred ontology of film
as something purer and healthier than all that is digital” (Murray, 2008:
87). However, the transcending of cinema across the boundaries of artis-
tic practice abolishes the illusion of any representational function, causing
192
ines Terrence Malick‘s film Days of Heaven (1978), he emphases the notion
of beauty.
Although venerable traditional aesthetic considerations on beauty
seem mostly obsolete, the concept of beauty cannot be simply discarded
considering that it is inscribed in the foundation of the very idea of all aes-
thetics. The cinematic reality, always one way or the other related to a per-
ception of beauty (or, as it were, its contrast) of images, therefore, cannot
be conceived without aesthetics, which in case of cinema transgresses the
boundaries of “just” art. Elsaesser and Hagener ascertained and anticipat-
ed in their clarification that “/…/ the cinema seems poised to leave behind
its function as a ‘medium’ (for the representation of reality) in order to be-
come a ‘life form‘ (and thus a reality in its own right)” (Elsaesser, Hage-
ner, 2010: 12). In a self-reflective turn (meaning cinema theory as the sub-
ject) they proceed with their argument, based on the assumption that film
theory “put the body and the senses at the centre” of its interest in the di-
rection, which in the age of ubiquitous digital communication does not
seem far-fetched anymore. They point out that the cinema is proposing to
us “/…/ besides a new way of knowing the world, also a new way of ‘being
in the world’, and thus demanding from film theory, next to a new episte-
mology also a new ontology‘” (Ibid.). On a “technical” level of descriptions
of what is going on, in both epistemology and ontology, film theory has to
deal with vibrant changes. For instance: once the theory made up its mind
and accepted DVD as the new medium, this “medium” or “material carri-
er” became much less important than video streaming through broad band
internet channels to a growing number of devices with HD screens. “On-
tology”, therefore, keeps having problems in its postulates on anything ob-
jective or constant in the “third nature”, which follows what Adorno and
Horkheimer à l’époque named the “second nature” within the industri-
al society. Obviously, we are living in the Lacanian reality of floating sig-
nifiers, compelled to give-up any hope to be able to construct a notion of
reality, which in Badiouan terms keeps being subverted by incursions of
“the real”. Of course, there are intellectual and simply nostalgic backlash-
es. Against the “growing popularity of Web and cell phone cinema” there
are strong opposing opinions: “Indeed, the rise of new media has brought
with it an increase in academic protection of the sacred ontology of film
as something purer and healthier than all that is digital” (Murray, 2008:
87). However, the transcending of cinema across the boundaries of artis-
tic practice abolishes the illusion of any representational function, causing
192
