Page 127 - Darko Štrajn, From Walter Benjamin to the End of Cinema: Identities, Illusion and Signification. Ljubljana: Educational Research Institute, 2017. Digital Library, Dissertationes, 29.
P. 127
robar-dor in‘s mir ror: r ams and mammoths in the context of yugoslav history
shape in the communist states of Europe: In the East a turn towards nation-
alism and new chauvinistic divisions started earlier, however, with a para-
doxical post-Stalinist disenchantment with Leninist enlightenment. From
1956 on, Eastern European communist leaders started to play the national-
ist card. (Ibid.: p. 48)
The “national question” was constantly analysed theoretically and
broadly discussed in public. Communism – especially in the case of the
former Yugoslavia – claimed to represent a space of true equality of its fed-
erated “nations” (or ethnicities), and in reality this claim could have with-
stood the benefit of the doubt. Of course, speaking about all communist
systems in the abstract omits many modifications. In the communist world
there were cases in which larger nations ruled over smaller ones, minori-
ties were repressed and excluded, and so on, which after all represented a
continuation of many cultural patterns acquired in the “imperialist” past.
However, in all cases the category of the national (or ethnic) was observed
one way or another.
There is another aspect that should be taken into account, one that in-
volves culture in a relation with notions of modernity and tradition. Dur-
ing modernism, broadly speaking, traditions were threatened or thorough-
ly changed. However, globalization unexpectedly brought about renewed
interest in all kinds of traditions. As I mentioned before in the Part II of
this book, this led Anthony Giddens to develop the notion of post-tradi-
tional society. Giddens found out that state socialism “paradoxically” in ef-
fect preserved traditions better than capitalism. (See: Giddens, 1996: p. 51).
What is further interesting in Giddens’ theory of de-traditionalization pro-
cesses is his assertion that “/…/ in the post-traditional order. . . traditions do
not wholly disappear; indeed in some respects, and in some contexts, they
flourish” (Giddens, 1996: 56). Therefore, he finds important the way tradi-
tions enter into the context of post-traditional society, and so he emphasiz-
es “preparedness to enter into dialogue while suspending the threat of vio-
lence.” He goes on to say: “Otherwise, tradition becomes fundamentalism”
(Giddens, 1996: p. 56). At the core of the “paradox”, concerning commu-
nist societies there was culture, which was the realm of the construction of
identity. How it happened that cultural tradition, also enveloping ethnicity,
became fundamentalist in some parts of the world in transition is difficult
to explain. This is particularly true in the case of the former communist
Yugoslavia, which was constituted on the principle of “equality of nations”
(i.e., ethnicities).
125
shape in the communist states of Europe: In the East a turn towards nation-
alism and new chauvinistic divisions started earlier, however, with a para-
doxical post-Stalinist disenchantment with Leninist enlightenment. From
1956 on, Eastern European communist leaders started to play the national-
ist card. (Ibid.: p. 48)
The “national question” was constantly analysed theoretically and
broadly discussed in public. Communism – especially in the case of the
former Yugoslavia – claimed to represent a space of true equality of its fed-
erated “nations” (or ethnicities), and in reality this claim could have with-
stood the benefit of the doubt. Of course, speaking about all communist
systems in the abstract omits many modifications. In the communist world
there were cases in which larger nations ruled over smaller ones, minori-
ties were repressed and excluded, and so on, which after all represented a
continuation of many cultural patterns acquired in the “imperialist” past.
However, in all cases the category of the national (or ethnic) was observed
one way or another.
There is another aspect that should be taken into account, one that in-
volves culture in a relation with notions of modernity and tradition. Dur-
ing modernism, broadly speaking, traditions were threatened or thorough-
ly changed. However, globalization unexpectedly brought about renewed
interest in all kinds of traditions. As I mentioned before in the Part II of
this book, this led Anthony Giddens to develop the notion of post-tradi-
tional society. Giddens found out that state socialism “paradoxically” in ef-
fect preserved traditions better than capitalism. (See: Giddens, 1996: p. 51).
What is further interesting in Giddens’ theory of de-traditionalization pro-
cesses is his assertion that “/…/ in the post-traditional order. . . traditions do
not wholly disappear; indeed in some respects, and in some contexts, they
flourish” (Giddens, 1996: 56). Therefore, he finds important the way tradi-
tions enter into the context of post-traditional society, and so he emphasiz-
es “preparedness to enter into dialogue while suspending the threat of vio-
lence.” He goes on to say: “Otherwise, tradition becomes fundamentalism”
(Giddens, 1996: p. 56). At the core of the “paradox”, concerning commu-
nist societies there was culture, which was the realm of the construction of
identity. How it happened that cultural tradition, also enveloping ethnicity,
became fundamentalist in some parts of the world in transition is difficult
to explain. This is particularly true in the case of the former communist
Yugoslavia, which was constituted on the principle of “equality of nations”
(i.e., ethnicities).
125
