Page 75 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 75
he linguistic-discursive creation of the speaker’s ethos for the
sake of persuasion: a key aspect of rhetoric and argumentation 75
tue (Maingueneau, 1991: 183).5 However, according to Aristotle the dis-
cursive construction of ethos does not happen explicitly by the orator’s
speaking about himself or by the author’s praising his own virtue but it
is built up implicitly by the speaker’s way of giving the speech (Maingue-
neau, 1987: 31). The orator thereby elaborates a kind of mask which is so-
cially acceptable and even desirable, a mask almost in the Jungian sense
(Jung, 1964: 311 ff.). However, ethos has also had a different meaning
ever since Greek antiquity. For the Greek philosopher Isocrates as well
as later on for the Roman philosophers Quintilian and Cicero for ex-
ample, ethos was not to be made up discursively, it was not supposed to
be a linguistic mask, but it should reflect the orator’s truly virtuous per-
sonality (Amossy, 1999: 19). To do justice to the concepts of both, Aris-
totle and Isocrates, Amossy distinguishes between discursive ethos and
prediscursive ethos, ethos discursif versus ethos prédiscursif or ethos préal-
able (Amossy, 2006: 79), the former referring to the constructed ethical
picture arising from discourse, the latter referring to the speaker’s true
personality. Anyways, ethos is usually seen as a “multifaceted rhetorical
concept” (Žmavc, 2012: 181), especially when dealt with from a historical
perspective. Žmavc (2012: 184–185) distinguishes between three ancient
traditions of rhetorical ethos: In the first conception which stems from
Plato and Isocrates ethos discloses the speaker’s moral character, “which
pre-exists discourse and should be reflected in the discourse.” The sec-
ond conception of rhetorical ethos derives from sophistic and textbook
rhetoric. It is about practical examples and rules which are used and ob-
served, respectively for the construction of speeches, often in connec-
tion with argumentative strategies which is typical of various sophists.
The third conception of rhetorical ethos would be the merging of the
“Greek rhetorical system” and the “Roman traditional oratory.” Howev-
er, maybe in order to simplify the rather complex conceptions of rhetor-
ical ethos, Žmavc (2012: 187) argues that generally speaking Greek rhet-
oric can be seen as a rhetoric of quarrel, whereas especially early Roman
rhetoric used to be a rhetoric of consensus.
In any case, when we talk about the role of ethos in discourse now-
adays, it still refers to the orator’s personality which arises from his or
her way of speaking (Maingueneau, 2002: 79) and not from “extra-dis-
cursive” knowledge the audience has about the orator (Maingueneau,
1999: 75). Orators have addressed audiences at all times and in all plac-
5 Žmavc (2012: 183) points out, though that these notions are not Aristotle’s but can be traced back
even to Homer’s Iliad.
sake of persuasion: a key aspect of rhetoric and argumentation 75
tue (Maingueneau, 1991: 183).5 However, according to Aristotle the dis-
cursive construction of ethos does not happen explicitly by the orator’s
speaking about himself or by the author’s praising his own virtue but it
is built up implicitly by the speaker’s way of giving the speech (Maingue-
neau, 1987: 31). The orator thereby elaborates a kind of mask which is so-
cially acceptable and even desirable, a mask almost in the Jungian sense
(Jung, 1964: 311 ff.). However, ethos has also had a different meaning
ever since Greek antiquity. For the Greek philosopher Isocrates as well
as later on for the Roman philosophers Quintilian and Cicero for ex-
ample, ethos was not to be made up discursively, it was not supposed to
be a linguistic mask, but it should reflect the orator’s truly virtuous per-
sonality (Amossy, 1999: 19). To do justice to the concepts of both, Aris-
totle and Isocrates, Amossy distinguishes between discursive ethos and
prediscursive ethos, ethos discursif versus ethos prédiscursif or ethos préal-
able (Amossy, 2006: 79), the former referring to the constructed ethical
picture arising from discourse, the latter referring to the speaker’s true
personality. Anyways, ethos is usually seen as a “multifaceted rhetorical
concept” (Žmavc, 2012: 181), especially when dealt with from a historical
perspective. Žmavc (2012: 184–185) distinguishes between three ancient
traditions of rhetorical ethos: In the first conception which stems from
Plato and Isocrates ethos discloses the speaker’s moral character, “which
pre-exists discourse and should be reflected in the discourse.” The sec-
ond conception of rhetorical ethos derives from sophistic and textbook
rhetoric. It is about practical examples and rules which are used and ob-
served, respectively for the construction of speeches, often in connec-
tion with argumentative strategies which is typical of various sophists.
The third conception of rhetorical ethos would be the merging of the
“Greek rhetorical system” and the “Roman traditional oratory.” Howev-
er, maybe in order to simplify the rather complex conceptions of rhetor-
ical ethos, Žmavc (2012: 187) argues that generally speaking Greek rhet-
oric can be seen as a rhetoric of quarrel, whereas especially early Roman
rhetoric used to be a rhetoric of consensus.
In any case, when we talk about the role of ethos in discourse now-
adays, it still refers to the orator’s personality which arises from his or
her way of speaking (Maingueneau, 2002: 79) and not from “extra-dis-
cursive” knowledge the audience has about the orator (Maingueneau,
1999: 75). Orators have addressed audiences at all times and in all plac-
5 Žmavc (2012: 183) points out, though that these notions are not Aristotle’s but can be traced back
even to Homer’s Iliad.
