Page 64 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 64
What Do We Know about the World?
However, one cannot, of course, present the viewpoints of different dis-
cursively reconstructed and implicit utterers in the way I have just done it:
as fully-fledged utterances, as if somebody actually uttered them. They are
just a reconstruction of the context. Consequently, it is not possible to assign
to the viewpoints of different implicit utterers, which have been recon-
structed within an utterance, a status that is equal to the status of the ex-
plicit utterance, which was taken as the starting point of the analysis, be-
cause they are nothing but products of the same analysis and therefore have
only a theoretical status. The viewpoints of different utterers should only
be presented in terms of attitudes, positions and orientations, so that one
could end up by analysing example (16’’) as having a locutor (speaker) and
(at least?) three utterers:
- U1 presents a fact F (the surprise party tomorrow evening), and
words its presentation in the form of an invitation;
- U2 recognises the presentation of U1 by accepting the invitation;
- U3 doubts the sincerity of U2 and therefore presents its consent (the
consent of U2) as doubtful;
- U2 opposes U3 and confirms its consent by a solemn turn of phrase.
One of Ducrot’s most famous analyses is the pragmatic use of the
French adverb toujours (Cadiot et al., 1985). Suppose we have an argumen-
tative string like:
(18) Allons au bistro. On y sera toujours au chaud.
Let’s go to a bistro. At least we’ll be warm there.’
According to Ducrot, we can distinguish at least five utterers with-
in (18):
- U1 presents a fact F, in our case a property P (warmth) of the object
O (bistro) – “it is warm in the bistro” –, and presents that property
as an advantage of the object O;
- U2 uses that favourable property P as an argument for the conclu
sion C (C = “Let’s go to a bistro”);
- U3 presents the property P as a merely weak advantage;
- U4 points out that weakness (of the property P) as a weakness that
takes away every argumentative value from the fact F – which re-
sults in rejecting the viewpoint of U2;
- U5, on the other hand, thinks that property P, though a weak
advantage, is still a possible argument for the conclusion C (“It is
a weak advantage, but it is nevertheless something”), thus rejecting
the viewpoint of U4.
However, one cannot, of course, present the viewpoints of different dis-
cursively reconstructed and implicit utterers in the way I have just done it:
as fully-fledged utterances, as if somebody actually uttered them. They are
just a reconstruction of the context. Consequently, it is not possible to assign
to the viewpoints of different implicit utterers, which have been recon-
structed within an utterance, a status that is equal to the status of the ex-
plicit utterance, which was taken as the starting point of the analysis, be-
cause they are nothing but products of the same analysis and therefore have
only a theoretical status. The viewpoints of different utterers should only
be presented in terms of attitudes, positions and orientations, so that one
could end up by analysing example (16’’) as having a locutor (speaker) and
(at least?) three utterers:
- U1 presents a fact F (the surprise party tomorrow evening), and
words its presentation in the form of an invitation;
- U2 recognises the presentation of U1 by accepting the invitation;
- U3 doubts the sincerity of U2 and therefore presents its consent (the
consent of U2) as doubtful;
- U2 opposes U3 and confirms its consent by a solemn turn of phrase.
One of Ducrot’s most famous analyses is the pragmatic use of the
French adverb toujours (Cadiot et al., 1985). Suppose we have an argumen-
tative string like:
(18) Allons au bistro. On y sera toujours au chaud.
Let’s go to a bistro. At least we’ll be warm there.’
According to Ducrot, we can distinguish at least five utterers with-
in (18):
- U1 presents a fact F, in our case a property P (warmth) of the object
O (bistro) – “it is warm in the bistro” –, and presents that property
as an advantage of the object O;
- U2 uses that favourable property P as an argument for the conclu
sion C (C = “Let’s go to a bistro”);
- U3 presents the property P as a merely weak advantage;
- U4 points out that weakness (of the property P) as a weakness that
takes away every argumentative value from the fact F – which re-
sults in rejecting the viewpoint of U2;
- U5, on the other hand, thinks that property P, though a weak
advantage, is still a possible argument for the conclusion C (“It is
a weak advantage, but it is nevertheless something”), thus rejecting
the viewpoint of U4.
