Page 284 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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What Do We Know about the World?
ing students to avoid fallacies because judges can penalize them, it could
be concluded that debate does not necessarily lead to hardened bias or
confirmation bias.
Moreover, debate does not necessarily lead to hardened bias or con-
firmation bias because the debate format can be adapted to avoid such
consequences. Fuentes and Santibáñez (2011) strongly suggest adding
a third team in the debate match, so as to facilitate understanding be-
tween adversaries. Quite often competitors do not refer to what the op-
ponents established as a reason for their point of view. Consequently, a
third team appointed to introduce into the debate the omitted informa-
tion or the motion’s core arguments, can help mitigating bias assimila-
tion and off topic debates.
3.2. Rejecting Close-Mindedness as Debating Outcomes
Close-mindedness and dichotomization do not necessarily result
from debating. Authorities argued that considering the issues regard-
less of prejudices (Alden, 1900) and developing the attitude to examine
and compare opinions before reaching a reasoned decision (Branham,
1991) are attributed to debate practice and the elements of open-mind-
edness, namely being receptive to new and different ideas (Johnson and
Johnson, 2000). These benefits suggest that debate is an effective tool
in preparing for a more thorough evaluation of the different points of
view and their reasons. Even the philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill
(1992) and Karl Popper (1962), recognized these benefits of debate prac-
tice; although, they were referring to less formalized debates than com-
petitive ones. As we have already hinted, these benefits are also support-
ed by previously presented empirical results as, for example learning and
understanding issues (Duffin, 2006; Scott, 2008). Furthermore, com-
petitive debate promotes understanding of counter-attitudinal points of
view. Tjosvold and Johnson (1977) and Tjosvold et al. (1980) assert that
the presence of controversy promotes a greater understanding of another
person’s cognitive perspective than when it is not present, and Bonomo
et al. (2010) claim that debate promotes tolerancia critica, namely accept-
ance of others without devaluing one’s own ideas and convictions. This
last outcome was empirically proved by Rogers and Rennels (in press)
in a 13-year-longitudinal survey. In their research Rogers and Rennels
conclude that “debaters were significantly more likely to display under-
standing and cultural tolerance than those who were not trained in com-
petitive debate”. As an ultimate proof, Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984),
after having taken into account the less than optimal evaluation of coun-
ing students to avoid fallacies because judges can penalize them, it could
be concluded that debate does not necessarily lead to hardened bias or
confirmation bias.
Moreover, debate does not necessarily lead to hardened bias or con-
firmation bias because the debate format can be adapted to avoid such
consequences. Fuentes and Santibáñez (2011) strongly suggest adding
a third team in the debate match, so as to facilitate understanding be-
tween adversaries. Quite often competitors do not refer to what the op-
ponents established as a reason for their point of view. Consequently, a
third team appointed to introduce into the debate the omitted informa-
tion or the motion’s core arguments, can help mitigating bias assimila-
tion and off topic debates.
3.2. Rejecting Close-Mindedness as Debating Outcomes
Close-mindedness and dichotomization do not necessarily result
from debating. Authorities argued that considering the issues regard-
less of prejudices (Alden, 1900) and developing the attitude to examine
and compare opinions before reaching a reasoned decision (Branham,
1991) are attributed to debate practice and the elements of open-mind-
edness, namely being receptive to new and different ideas (Johnson and
Johnson, 2000). These benefits suggest that debate is an effective tool
in preparing for a more thorough evaluation of the different points of
view and their reasons. Even the philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill
(1992) and Karl Popper (1962), recognized these benefits of debate prac-
tice; although, they were referring to less formalized debates than com-
petitive ones. As we have already hinted, these benefits are also support-
ed by previously presented empirical results as, for example learning and
understanding issues (Duffin, 2006; Scott, 2008). Furthermore, com-
petitive debate promotes understanding of counter-attitudinal points of
view. Tjosvold and Johnson (1977) and Tjosvold et al. (1980) assert that
the presence of controversy promotes a greater understanding of another
person’s cognitive perspective than when it is not present, and Bonomo
et al. (2010) claim that debate promotes tolerancia critica, namely accept-
ance of others without devaluing one’s own ideas and convictions. This
last outcome was empirically proved by Rogers and Rennels (in press)
in a 13-year-longitudinal survey. In their research Rogers and Rennels
conclude that “debaters were significantly more likely to display under-
standing and cultural tolerance than those who were not trained in com-
petitive debate”. As an ultimate proof, Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984),
after having taken into account the less than optimal evaluation of coun-
