Page 151 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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political discourse and argumentation profiles 151
The kinds of arguments we identified, in descending order of frequency,
were these:
Negative Consequences, Practical Reasoning, Positive Consequences, Ar-
gument from Sign, Fairness, Direct ad hominem, Inconsistent Commit-
ments, Popular Opinion, Analogy, Commitment, Position to Know, Ad
Hominem Circumstantial, Misplaced Priorities, Authority, Classification,
Explanation, Values, Argument from Alternatives, Cause to Effect, Corre-
lation to Cause, Sympathy.
In constructing argumentation profiles, one looks to see which kinds of ar-
guments are preferred by the argument agent.
2. Pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes: It is also possible to
classify arguments broadly on the basis of the kind of conduit they pro-
vide from premises to conclusions. Pragma-dialectical theory offers a
three-fold classification in this category: symptomatic argumentation,
instrumental argumentation, and similarity argumentation (van Eemer-
en and Grootendorst, 1992: 94 ff.). Even though there are only three
‘schemes’ here they have the advantage that they are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive, or at least appear to be so. (The same cannot be
said for the informal logic schemes: with them it is possible that an ar-
gument could instance two schemes, and then a decision has to be made
about which scheme is the better fit to the argument.) Nevertheless, be-
cause there are only three schemes in this typology, we can only expect
very general information to come from this classification. But, as before,
one is curious to see if an argument agent prefers one kind of scheme to
the others.
3. Aristotle’s pisteis: Aristotle’s three artificial means of persuasion
might also give us some insight into the argumentation proclivities of
agents (See Rhet. 1356a). We will attempt to classify arguments on the
basis of whether it is logos (appeal to evidence), ethos (character) or pathos
(emotion) that is brought to bear.
These first three categories of classification (kinds, schemes, pisteis)
have to do with the internal nature of the arguments themselves – they
are ways of classifying either the kind of reasons brought to bear, or the
way that the reasons are related to the conclusion. It is also possible to
study the external (relational) properties of arguments in an ongoing po-
litical discussion, in particular to consider the roles, or functions, of the
arguments in the ongoing discussions.
4. Dialectical roles: Argument agents have purposes they want to
achieve by the use of their arguments and thus the arguments are instru-
The kinds of arguments we identified, in descending order of frequency,
were these:
Negative Consequences, Practical Reasoning, Positive Consequences, Ar-
gument from Sign, Fairness, Direct ad hominem, Inconsistent Commit-
ments, Popular Opinion, Analogy, Commitment, Position to Know, Ad
Hominem Circumstantial, Misplaced Priorities, Authority, Classification,
Explanation, Values, Argument from Alternatives, Cause to Effect, Corre-
lation to Cause, Sympathy.
In constructing argumentation profiles, one looks to see which kinds of ar-
guments are preferred by the argument agent.
2. Pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes: It is also possible to
classify arguments broadly on the basis of the kind of conduit they pro-
vide from premises to conclusions. Pragma-dialectical theory offers a
three-fold classification in this category: symptomatic argumentation,
instrumental argumentation, and similarity argumentation (van Eemer-
en and Grootendorst, 1992: 94 ff.). Even though there are only three
‘schemes’ here they have the advantage that they are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive, or at least appear to be so. (The same cannot be
said for the informal logic schemes: with them it is possible that an ar-
gument could instance two schemes, and then a decision has to be made
about which scheme is the better fit to the argument.) Nevertheless, be-
cause there are only three schemes in this typology, we can only expect
very general information to come from this classification. But, as before,
one is curious to see if an argument agent prefers one kind of scheme to
the others.
3. Aristotle’s pisteis: Aristotle’s three artificial means of persuasion
might also give us some insight into the argumentation proclivities of
agents (See Rhet. 1356a). We will attempt to classify arguments on the
basis of whether it is logos (appeal to evidence), ethos (character) or pathos
(emotion) that is brought to bear.
These first three categories of classification (kinds, schemes, pisteis)
have to do with the internal nature of the arguments themselves – they
are ways of classifying either the kind of reasons brought to bear, or the
way that the reasons are related to the conclusion. It is also possible to
study the external (relational) properties of arguments in an ongoing po-
litical discussion, in particular to consider the roles, or functions, of the
arguments in the ongoing discussions.
4. Dialectical roles: Argument agents have purposes they want to
achieve by the use of their arguments and thus the arguments are instru-