Page 88 - Oswald Ducrot, Slovenian Lectures, Digitalna knjižnica/Digital Library, Dissertationes 6
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Slovenian Lectures
jective, of which denotation and connotation are a particular case, is the
opposition I spoke about in the first lecture between what the grammar of
Port-Royal called the dictum and the modus or again, the opposition be-
tween what speech-act theorists call on the one hand, the propositional con-
tent and on the other, the illocutionary force. In the three cases, the basis is
ultimately the same concepts but used in a different way. Now, precisely, I
am trying not to use that facile opposition between the objective and the
subjective. I try not to use it because I do not really know what the objec-
tive is – personally, I have never come across the objective in my life, what-
ever efforts I may have made to do so. So, for me, that opposition, which is
apparently a very clear one, because we are accustomed to it, is in fact a very
confused one. What I am attempting to do, as I have been explaining from
the beginning of this series of lectures is (how shall I say?) to amalgamate
the objective and the subjective. The notion of argumentation which I am
developing here mixes what could be called the objective and the subjective
components of meaning together. You remember that I blamed speech-act
philosophy, or the grammar of Port-Royal, with maintaining a separate slot
for a sort of objective, factual, truth-functional capture of reality: the dic-
tum or propositional content. So now, I cannot use the denotation-connota-
tion opposition, which, ultimately, is of the same type. That is why I feel a
certain repugnancy (the word may be a little too strong, but never mind)
from those notions.
Now, I must also show (this is the “serious” part of my criticism) that
in the analysis of the adjectives I am interested in, that distinction between
denotation and connotation produces relatively unsatisfactory results. The
theory I am discussing at the moment posits that there is a common com-
ponent, “a”, in prudent and timorous, which is the denoted component “Pe-
ter avoids taking risks”: from the denotational point of view, the same thing
is alleged to be said in either case. But, does that idea correspond to the
meaning we give to the words prudent and timorous? I think not. When I
say that someone is prudent, what are the risks which, according to me, he
avoids taking, and justifiably does? The risks he avoids taking are unreason-
able risks, bad risks. The prudent person avoids taking risks which should
not be taken, and I cannot possibly approve his taking such risks. When on
the contrary, I say that someone is timorous, I am of course saying that he
avoids taking risks. But which risks? The risks which he avoids and which I
blame him for avoiding are reasonable risks, or merely apparent ones. The
timorous person keeps away from risks which in fact, he should take where-
as the prudent person keeps away from risks which are unreasonable, which
jective, of which denotation and connotation are a particular case, is the
opposition I spoke about in the first lecture between what the grammar of
Port-Royal called the dictum and the modus or again, the opposition be-
tween what speech-act theorists call on the one hand, the propositional con-
tent and on the other, the illocutionary force. In the three cases, the basis is
ultimately the same concepts but used in a different way. Now, precisely, I
am trying not to use that facile opposition between the objective and the
subjective. I try not to use it because I do not really know what the objec-
tive is – personally, I have never come across the objective in my life, what-
ever efforts I may have made to do so. So, for me, that opposition, which is
apparently a very clear one, because we are accustomed to it, is in fact a very
confused one. What I am attempting to do, as I have been explaining from
the beginning of this series of lectures is (how shall I say?) to amalgamate
the objective and the subjective. The notion of argumentation which I am
developing here mixes what could be called the objective and the subjective
components of meaning together. You remember that I blamed speech-act
philosophy, or the grammar of Port-Royal, with maintaining a separate slot
for a sort of objective, factual, truth-functional capture of reality: the dic-
tum or propositional content. So now, I cannot use the denotation-connota-
tion opposition, which, ultimately, is of the same type. That is why I feel a
certain repugnancy (the word may be a little too strong, but never mind)
from those notions.
Now, I must also show (this is the “serious” part of my criticism) that
in the analysis of the adjectives I am interested in, that distinction between
denotation and connotation produces relatively unsatisfactory results. The
theory I am discussing at the moment posits that there is a common com-
ponent, “a”, in prudent and timorous, which is the denoted component “Pe-
ter avoids taking risks”: from the denotational point of view, the same thing
is alleged to be said in either case. But, does that idea correspond to the
meaning we give to the words prudent and timorous? I think not. When I
say that someone is prudent, what are the risks which, according to me, he
avoids taking, and justifiably does? The risks he avoids taking are unreason-
able risks, bad risks. The prudent person avoids taking risks which should
not be taken, and I cannot possibly approve his taking such risks. When on
the contrary, I say that someone is timorous, I am of course saying that he
avoids taking risks. But which risks? The risks which he avoids and which I
blame him for avoiding are reasonable risks, or merely apparent ones. The
timorous person keeps away from risks which in fact, he should take where-
as the prudent person keeps away from risks which are unreasonable, which
