Page 73 - Oswald Ducrot, Slovenian Lectures, Digitalna knjižnica/Digital Library, Dissertationes 6
P. 73
Lecture IV
cording to which in fact, the linguist was not at his hotel but much further
from the place of the crime, for example that he was visiting a castle situat-
ed out of town, in the country. Now, having said “At four thirty, he was at
his hotel”, a policeman may very well say to correct what he has just said:
“In fact, he was even visiting the castle”. I think that the policeman would
really tend to use an even to correct the first piece of information. Now, re-
member my description of even. I say that even relates two arguments mov-
ing towards a common conclusion, the second argument being represent-
ed as more forceful than the first. So, “He was at the castle” is a more force-
ful argument than “He was at the hotel” for the conclusion aimed at (“He’s
not guilty”). Why more forceful? If it is a more forceful argument, it is be-
cause the topos which the policeman was using was not When a person is not
in a place, he cannot do anything there but rather The further a person is from
a place, the lesser he can do something there, so that the linguist being in the
castle at the material time, he was even less likely to have committed the
murder than if he had been at the hotel.
A last word about that example. It is an interesting one to distinguish
those two notions which I have already spoken about: the notions of ar-
gumentation and reasoning. Indeed, in his reasoning process, the police-
man (I have no reason to take him for a fool) was surely using the non-sca-
lar principle When a person is not in a place, he cannot do anything there:
that was how he reasoned in his head. But what I am concerned about is
what the policeman said, not his reasoning process. In so much as the po-
liceman uses an even (“He was at his hotel, and in fact, he was even at the
castle”), what he says implies a scalar vision of the relationship between dis-
tance and the possibility of action. I must distinguish on the one hand, rea-
soning, which is not necessarily scalar, and on the other, argumentation,
relevant to what people say, which, in my view, is always scalar. If one ac-
cepts that description of even which I have given, a description according
to which even joins two arguments, the second of which is represented as
more forceful than the first for their common conclusion, then one must
say that, in what he says, I stress, in what he says, the policeman does use a
scalar principle, even if it is not at all the principle which commands his
reasoning. That example is worth noticing only if one clearly distinguish-
es reasoning, by which from certain facts certain other facts are concluded
(and that is not my business, it is something for logicians to worry about)
and on the other hand, the arguments through which speech conveys them.
My thesis is that argumentation, as formulated in speech, is based on sca-
lar principles. Everything that I have said supposes a clear-cut distinction
cording to which in fact, the linguist was not at his hotel but much further
from the place of the crime, for example that he was visiting a castle situat-
ed out of town, in the country. Now, having said “At four thirty, he was at
his hotel”, a policeman may very well say to correct what he has just said:
“In fact, he was even visiting the castle”. I think that the policeman would
really tend to use an even to correct the first piece of information. Now, re-
member my description of even. I say that even relates two arguments mov-
ing towards a common conclusion, the second argument being represent-
ed as more forceful than the first. So, “He was at the castle” is a more force-
ful argument than “He was at the hotel” for the conclusion aimed at (“He’s
not guilty”). Why more forceful? If it is a more forceful argument, it is be-
cause the topos which the policeman was using was not When a person is not
in a place, he cannot do anything there but rather The further a person is from
a place, the lesser he can do something there, so that the linguist being in the
castle at the material time, he was even less likely to have committed the
murder than if he had been at the hotel.
A last word about that example. It is an interesting one to distinguish
those two notions which I have already spoken about: the notions of ar-
gumentation and reasoning. Indeed, in his reasoning process, the police-
man (I have no reason to take him for a fool) was surely using the non-sca-
lar principle When a person is not in a place, he cannot do anything there:
that was how he reasoned in his head. But what I am concerned about is
what the policeman said, not his reasoning process. In so much as the po-
liceman uses an even (“He was at his hotel, and in fact, he was even at the
castle”), what he says implies a scalar vision of the relationship between dis-
tance and the possibility of action. I must distinguish on the one hand, rea-
soning, which is not necessarily scalar, and on the other, argumentation,
relevant to what people say, which, in my view, is always scalar. If one ac-
cepts that description of even which I have given, a description according
to which even joins two arguments, the second of which is represented as
more forceful than the first for their common conclusion, then one must
say that, in what he says, I stress, in what he says, the policeman does use a
scalar principle, even if it is not at all the principle which commands his
reasoning. That example is worth noticing only if one clearly distinguish-
es reasoning, by which from certain facts certain other facts are concluded
(and that is not my business, it is something for logicians to worry about)
and on the other hand, the arguments through which speech conveys them.
My thesis is that argumentation, as formulated in speech, is based on sca-
lar principles. Everything that I have said supposes a clear-cut distinction
