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Slovenian Lectures
even, there was John, who is even more amusing”.It could mean “We got
very bored: there was Peter, who is very boring, and there was even John
who is worse than boring”. It could mean “The meeting was a great social
event: there was Peter, who is the Prime Minister, and even, there was John,
who is the President of the Republic”. It could mean “The meeting was a
great failure: there was Peter, who has really no social status and there was
John, who has even less of a social status”. You can imagine what you like.
But once you see an even between two segments, you must say to yourself
that both segments are oriented towards a common conclusion. Or, in my
terminology, each of those segments represents an enunciator whose point
of view is oriented towards a certain conclusion.
After having tried to explain what I mean by argumentative orientation,
I would like to make what I have just been saying clearer, and then after a
little pause, I will try to justify the general thesis that I formulated at the be-
ginning of this lecture (for the moment, it is not at all justified). I would
like you on the one hand to notice the expression represented, which I used
in my definition of argumentative points of view. Let me read my definition
over to you again: to say that an enunciator’s point of view is argumenta-
tively oriented is to say that it is represented as being able to justify a certain
conclusion. I must insist upon the reasons that have led me to say represent-
ed as, and not simply justify a certain conclusion. Imagine a short stretch of
discourse, in which one is speaking about someone whom I will once again
call Peter: “Peter is stupid, so he’ll be successful”. It does not seem at all stu-
pid to me to say things of that sort. Stupidity, in a great number of cases, is
wholly an asset for at least a certain type of success. Let us suppose that I
say to you “Peter is stupid, so he’ll be successful”. Given the presence of so,
one must (if the preceding analyses are correct) accept that stupidity is ori-
ented towards a conclusion of the success type. But that does not at all force
the linguist, as such, to think that stupidity, in general, is a cause for suc-
cess. It only means that in a particular discourse, stupidity is represented as
a cause for success, as a factor of success. The important thing is what is rep-
resented in a piece of discourse as justifying a conclusion, not what effec-
tively does justify it.
Second and last clarification. To say that a segment A has an argumen-
tative function is quite different from claiming (this point is for me abso-
lutely essential) that A is an argument in the logical sense of the word, that
is to say a premise for a conclusion in a piece of reasoning. Remember my
example “Peter would have liked to come but he couldn’t”. I said that the
first segment was argumentatively oriented towards Peter’s coming. But it
even, there was John, who is even more amusing”.It could mean “We got
very bored: there was Peter, who is very boring, and there was even John
who is worse than boring”. It could mean “The meeting was a great social
event: there was Peter, who is the Prime Minister, and even, there was John,
who is the President of the Republic”. It could mean “The meeting was a
great failure: there was Peter, who has really no social status and there was
John, who has even less of a social status”. You can imagine what you like.
But once you see an even between two segments, you must say to yourself
that both segments are oriented towards a common conclusion. Or, in my
terminology, each of those segments represents an enunciator whose point
of view is oriented towards a certain conclusion.
After having tried to explain what I mean by argumentative orientation,
I would like to make what I have just been saying clearer, and then after a
little pause, I will try to justify the general thesis that I formulated at the be-
ginning of this lecture (for the moment, it is not at all justified). I would
like you on the one hand to notice the expression represented, which I used
in my definition of argumentative points of view. Let me read my definition
over to you again: to say that an enunciator’s point of view is argumenta-
tively oriented is to say that it is represented as being able to justify a certain
conclusion. I must insist upon the reasons that have led me to say represent-
ed as, and not simply justify a certain conclusion. Imagine a short stretch of
discourse, in which one is speaking about someone whom I will once again
call Peter: “Peter is stupid, so he’ll be successful”. It does not seem at all stu-
pid to me to say things of that sort. Stupidity, in a great number of cases, is
wholly an asset for at least a certain type of success. Let us suppose that I
say to you “Peter is stupid, so he’ll be successful”. Given the presence of so,
one must (if the preceding analyses are correct) accept that stupidity is ori-
ented towards a conclusion of the success type. But that does not at all force
the linguist, as such, to think that stupidity, in general, is a cause for suc-
cess. It only means that in a particular discourse, stupidity is represented as
a cause for success, as a factor of success. The important thing is what is rep-
resented in a piece of discourse as justifying a conclusion, not what effec-
tively does justify it.
Second and last clarification. To say that a segment A has an argumen-
tative function is quite different from claiming (this point is for me abso-
lutely essential) that A is an argument in the logical sense of the word, that
is to say a premise for a conclusion in a piece of reasoning. Remember my
example “Peter would have liked to come but he couldn’t”. I said that the
first segment was argumentatively oriented towards Peter’s coming. But it
