Page 50 - Oswald Ducrot, Slovenian Lectures, Digitalna knjižnica/Digital Library, Dissertationes 6
P. 50
Slovenian Lectures
to last time. Now, I am still quite far from having completed the task I have
set myself (as a matter of fact, fortunately so, as I have another three lec-
tures to find material for!). I have only shown that an utterance could not
be described in terms of truth and of falsehood but I have not shown that
the different enunciators’ points of view could not be described in terms
of truth and falsehood. I have forced out those notions of truth and false-
hood from the global meaning of an utterance but they might remain val-
id as far as the enunciator’s points of view are concerned. The task I must
now accomplish consists in forcing the notion of truth and of information
out from not only the global meaning but also the enunciator’s points of
view. I will have to show you a way of describing those points of view which
does not bring in the notion of truth or of information. That is what I am
going to do, or try to do, with the theory of argumentation, about which I
am going to speak in the last three lectures. Today, I will give you a gener-
al picture of this theory, two aspects of which I will develop in the two re-
maining lectures.
I have built up this theory of argumentation with several collaborators:
the one I have most worked with is Jean-Claude Anscombre, with whom I
have written several books and articles, and we have called our theory the
theory of argumentation in the language-system, in short the TAL. I will be
introducing the general idea of the TAL now. To do so, I will have to im-
pose a few definitions upon you first, which I apologize for. Then, I will try
to illustrate those definitions with as many examples as possible. But I can-
not avoid starting with a few austere and repelling definitions.
***
The general thesis of the TAL is that the argumentative function of a
discourse segment is at least partly determined by its linguistic structure,
whether the segment in question is an utterance or a segment of an utter-
ance. When I speak of linguistic structure, I mean the sentence, which in a
previous lecture I have defined as being a linguistic entity. The argumenta-
tive function of a discourse segment is at least partly determined by its lin-
guistic structure, and irrespective of the information which that segment
conveys about the outer world. So, the argumentative function or value (I
have not yet said what that was but I shall do so in a moment) is determined
by the language-system itself. That is why we have called our theory the the-
ory of argumentation IN the language-system. [In Saussure’s terms], for us,
the argumentative value of parole has its origin in langue: the language-sys-
tem determines what speech is argumentatively used for. Now, I must de-
to last time. Now, I am still quite far from having completed the task I have
set myself (as a matter of fact, fortunately so, as I have another three lec-
tures to find material for!). I have only shown that an utterance could not
be described in terms of truth and of falsehood but I have not shown that
the different enunciators’ points of view could not be described in terms
of truth and falsehood. I have forced out those notions of truth and false-
hood from the global meaning of an utterance but they might remain val-
id as far as the enunciator’s points of view are concerned. The task I must
now accomplish consists in forcing the notion of truth and of information
out from not only the global meaning but also the enunciator’s points of
view. I will have to show you a way of describing those points of view which
does not bring in the notion of truth or of information. That is what I am
going to do, or try to do, with the theory of argumentation, about which I
am going to speak in the last three lectures. Today, I will give you a gener-
al picture of this theory, two aspects of which I will develop in the two re-
maining lectures.
I have built up this theory of argumentation with several collaborators:
the one I have most worked with is Jean-Claude Anscombre, with whom I
have written several books and articles, and we have called our theory the
theory of argumentation in the language-system, in short the TAL. I will be
introducing the general idea of the TAL now. To do so, I will have to im-
pose a few definitions upon you first, which I apologize for. Then, I will try
to illustrate those definitions with as many examples as possible. But I can-
not avoid starting with a few austere and repelling definitions.
***
The general thesis of the TAL is that the argumentative function of a
discourse segment is at least partly determined by its linguistic structure,
whether the segment in question is an utterance or a segment of an utter-
ance. When I speak of linguistic structure, I mean the sentence, which in a
previous lecture I have defined as being a linguistic entity. The argumenta-
tive function of a discourse segment is at least partly determined by its lin-
guistic structure, and irrespective of the information which that segment
conveys about the outer world. So, the argumentative function or value (I
have not yet said what that was but I shall do so in a moment) is determined
by the language-system itself. That is why we have called our theory the the-
ory of argumentation IN the language-system. [In Saussure’s terms], for us,
the argumentative value of parole has its origin in langue: the language-sys-
tem determines what speech is argumentatively used for. Now, I must de-
