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Slovenian Lectures
ysis. Pascal makes someone speak, who criticizes elegance, who disagrees
with E2. When I say makes someone speak, I am using a metaphor of course:
enunciators do not actually speak. Enunciators do not have a mouth to
speak with, they are merely points of view. One should rather say that Pas-
cal makes enunciator E2, according to whom elegance is a vanity, think.
Now, I claim that there is another enunciator whom I will call E1, an
enunciator according to whom one must be elegant. That means that one
would have a sort of dialogue with three turns: “One must be elegant”;
“No, elegance is vain”; “No, elegance is not vain”. Why do I bring in that
E1 enunciator which is, apparently, quite an arbitrary thing to do? I will
say that enunciator E1 is contained in the word elegant itself. It is not easy
to define being elegant. If you wanted to describe that predicate in descrip-
tive terms, you would be at pains to do so. I will say that being elegant is be-
ing well-dressed and the word well is crucial in my analysis, because in the
very notion of elegance there is the notion of a way of dressing which is
good, a point which, precisely, my paraphrase brings out. One could say the
same thing in another way by saying that in the very notion of elegance, as
a word of the language-system, there is the idea that elegance is a quality,
and that idea is part of the very notion of elegance. So, it seems to me that
in the word itself, as an item of the lexicon, there is a sort of justification of
elegance, a justification which is like a fragment of discourse written into
the word elegant: the word elegance in itself comprises a justification of ele-
gance. About an example studied yesterday (the example of parents telling
their children not to touch a dog because the dog is dirty), I said that the
word dirty in itself contained a criticism of dirtiness and that one could not
understand the word dirty without introducing a sort of discourse accord-
ing to which dirtiness must be kept away from. Similarly, but inversely, ele-
gance is a way of dressing which is good. So, in Pascal’s text, there is enun-
ciator E1 who picks up that element contained in the lexicon. I will say, if
you like, that he is a lexical enunciator. Whereas the enunciators introduced
by not are enunciators whom one could call syntactical, E1 is an enunciator
incorporated in the lexicon of the language-system itself through whom
viewing elegance as a quality is imposed.
How is one now to justify that analysis? I will put forward two justi-
fications. The first justification is that the analysis is wholly in conformi-
ty with Pascal’s political theories, and especially those which are expound-
ed immediately after that remark in Pascal’s text itself. For Pascal (let me re-
mind you of his political theory), there are three possible attitudes towards
the organisation of society and generally towards power. There is firstly the
ysis. Pascal makes someone speak, who criticizes elegance, who disagrees
with E2. When I say makes someone speak, I am using a metaphor of course:
enunciators do not actually speak. Enunciators do not have a mouth to
speak with, they are merely points of view. One should rather say that Pas-
cal makes enunciator E2, according to whom elegance is a vanity, think.
Now, I claim that there is another enunciator whom I will call E1, an
enunciator according to whom one must be elegant. That means that one
would have a sort of dialogue with three turns: “One must be elegant”;
“No, elegance is vain”; “No, elegance is not vain”. Why do I bring in that
E1 enunciator which is, apparently, quite an arbitrary thing to do? I will
say that enunciator E1 is contained in the word elegant itself. It is not easy
to define being elegant. If you wanted to describe that predicate in descrip-
tive terms, you would be at pains to do so. I will say that being elegant is be-
ing well-dressed and the word well is crucial in my analysis, because in the
very notion of elegance there is the notion of a way of dressing which is
good, a point which, precisely, my paraphrase brings out. One could say the
same thing in another way by saying that in the very notion of elegance, as
a word of the language-system, there is the idea that elegance is a quality,
and that idea is part of the very notion of elegance. So, it seems to me that
in the word itself, as an item of the lexicon, there is a sort of justification of
elegance, a justification which is like a fragment of discourse written into
the word elegant: the word elegance in itself comprises a justification of ele-
gance. About an example studied yesterday (the example of parents telling
their children not to touch a dog because the dog is dirty), I said that the
word dirty in itself contained a criticism of dirtiness and that one could not
understand the word dirty without introducing a sort of discourse accord-
ing to which dirtiness must be kept away from. Similarly, but inversely, ele-
gance is a way of dressing which is good. So, in Pascal’s text, there is enun-
ciator E1 who picks up that element contained in the lexicon. I will say, if
you like, that he is a lexical enunciator. Whereas the enunciators introduced
by not are enunciators whom one could call syntactical, E1 is an enunciator
incorporated in the lexicon of the language-system itself through whom
viewing elegance as a quality is imposed.
How is one now to justify that analysis? I will put forward two justi-
fications. The first justification is that the analysis is wholly in conformi-
ty with Pascal’s political theories, and especially those which are expound-
ed immediately after that remark in Pascal’s text itself. For Pascal (let me re-
mind you of his political theory), there are three possible attitudes towards
the organisation of society and generally towards power. There is firstly the
