Page 40 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
P. 40
four critical essays on argumentation
true (or false) in any logical (or absolute) sense of the term: One must have
good (specific) reasons and specific (appropriately oriented) intentions for
uttering them.
Which brings us to an important part of this discussion, the question
of framing.
What is judged true in a schoolbook may not be so judged in a
work of historical research. Consider the constative, ‘Lord Raglan
won the battle of Alma’, remembering that Alma was a soldier’s
battle if ever there was one, and that Lord Raglan’s orders were
never transmitted to some of his subordinates. Did Lord Raglan
then win the battle of Alma or did he not? Of course in some con-
texts, perhaps in a schoolbook, it is perfectly justifiable to say so-
—it is something of an exaggeration, maybe, and there would be
no question of giving Raglan a medal for it. As ‘France is hexag-
onal’ is rough, so ‘Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma’ is exag-
gerated and suitable to some contexts and not to others; it would
be pointless to insist on its truth or falsity. (Austin ibid.: 143–44)
Truth, falsity and the context
What we say can therefore not only be more or less true, true up to a point,
or true for certain intents and purposes, it can also be true only in some con-
texts, but not in others. And that is not all, Austin’s relativization continues:
Thirdly, let us consider the question whether it is true that all snow
geese migrate to Labrador, given that perhaps one maimed one sometimes
fails when migrating to get quite the whole way. Faced with such prob-
lems, many have claimed, with much justice, that utterances such as those
beginning ‘All...’ are prescriptive definitions or advice to adopt a rule. But
what rule? This idea arises partly through not understanding the reference
of such statements, which is limited to the known; we cannot quite make the
simple statement that the truth of statements depends on facts as distinct
from knowledge of facts. Suppose that before Australia is discovered X says
‘All swans are white’. If you later find a black swan in Australia, is X refut-
ed? Is his statement false now? Not necessarily: he will take it back but he
could say ‘I wasn’t talking about swans absolutely everywhere; for example,
I was not making a statement about possible swans on Mars’. Reference de-
pends on knowledge at the time of utterance. (Austin ibid.: 144)
If we sum up all these Austin’s hedgings, we get the following:
40
true (or false) in any logical (or absolute) sense of the term: One must have
good (specific) reasons and specific (appropriately oriented) intentions for
uttering them.
Which brings us to an important part of this discussion, the question
of framing.
What is judged true in a schoolbook may not be so judged in a
work of historical research. Consider the constative, ‘Lord Raglan
won the battle of Alma’, remembering that Alma was a soldier’s
battle if ever there was one, and that Lord Raglan’s orders were
never transmitted to some of his subordinates. Did Lord Raglan
then win the battle of Alma or did he not? Of course in some con-
texts, perhaps in a schoolbook, it is perfectly justifiable to say so-
—it is something of an exaggeration, maybe, and there would be
no question of giving Raglan a medal for it. As ‘France is hexag-
onal’ is rough, so ‘Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma’ is exag-
gerated and suitable to some contexts and not to others; it would
be pointless to insist on its truth or falsity. (Austin ibid.: 143–44)
Truth, falsity and the context
What we say can therefore not only be more or less true, true up to a point,
or true for certain intents and purposes, it can also be true only in some con-
texts, but not in others. And that is not all, Austin’s relativization continues:
Thirdly, let us consider the question whether it is true that all snow
geese migrate to Labrador, given that perhaps one maimed one sometimes
fails when migrating to get quite the whole way. Faced with such prob-
lems, many have claimed, with much justice, that utterances such as those
beginning ‘All...’ are prescriptive definitions or advice to adopt a rule. But
what rule? This idea arises partly through not understanding the reference
of such statements, which is limited to the known; we cannot quite make the
simple statement that the truth of statements depends on facts as distinct
from knowledge of facts. Suppose that before Australia is discovered X says
‘All swans are white’. If you later find a black swan in Australia, is X refut-
ed? Is his statement false now? Not necessarily: he will take it back but he
could say ‘I wasn’t talking about swans absolutely everywhere; for example,
I was not making a statement about possible swans on Mars’. Reference de-
pends on knowledge at the time of utterance. (Austin ibid.: 144)
If we sum up all these Austin’s hedgings, we get the following:
40
