Page 27 - Žagar, Igor Ž. 2021. Four Critical Essays on Argumentation. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.
P. 27
topoi in critical discourse analysis
These are the theorethical and methodological preliminaries that lead
us to topoi, not yet the topoi themselves! To be able to select subject appro-
priate claims, premises for concrete context-dependent reasonings from the
pool of potential propositions, we need organa or tools. Aristotle distin-
guishes four:
The means by which we shall obtain an abundance of reasonings
are four in number: (1) the provision of propositions, (2) the ability
to distinguish in how many senses a particular expression is used,
(3) the discovery of differences and (4) the investigation of similar-
ities. (T. I xiii. 21–26)
Strictly speaking, we are not yet dealing with topoi here as well, though
very often and in many interpretations13 the four organa, as well as the four
predicables, are considered to be topoi (and in the case of predicables, may-
be even the topoi).
Another complicating moment in this respect may be that Aristotle
described topoi as ‘empty places’ where concrete arguments, for different
purposes, can be found. And even if this sounds paradoxical, it is quite log-
ical: if those places were not empty, allowing for each concrete matter to
be moulded in them, but already filled up, they just would not be common
anymore, and we would not be able to use them for each and every subject
matter, but just in that one described and defined with the concrete con-
tent of a particular premise.
Aristotle had ambiguous characterisations of topos—and he used
many, not always very consistent with one another. Consider the follow-
ing (Rhet. 1403a17–18, 2.26.1): ‘I call the same thing element and topos; for
an element or topos is a heading under which many enthymemes fall.’ It is
important to emphasize that by ‘element’ Aristotle does not mean a proper
part of the enthymeme, but a general form under which many concrete en-
thymemes of the same type can be subsumed. According to this definition,
topos is a general argumentative form or pattern, and concrete arguments
are instantiations of this general form. Or as Auctor ad Herennium puts it
(3–29.15ss): loci are the background and concrete arguments are imagines
(images) on that background.
In the Topics, Aristotle actually established a very complex typology
of topoi with hundreds of particular topoi: about 300 in the Topics, but just
13 See Rubinelli 2009: 8–14.
27
These are the theorethical and methodological preliminaries that lead
us to topoi, not yet the topoi themselves! To be able to select subject appro-
priate claims, premises for concrete context-dependent reasonings from the
pool of potential propositions, we need organa or tools. Aristotle distin-
guishes four:
The means by which we shall obtain an abundance of reasonings
are four in number: (1) the provision of propositions, (2) the ability
to distinguish in how many senses a particular expression is used,
(3) the discovery of differences and (4) the investigation of similar-
ities. (T. I xiii. 21–26)
Strictly speaking, we are not yet dealing with topoi here as well, though
very often and in many interpretations13 the four organa, as well as the four
predicables, are considered to be topoi (and in the case of predicables, may-
be even the topoi).
Another complicating moment in this respect may be that Aristotle
described topoi as ‘empty places’ where concrete arguments, for different
purposes, can be found. And even if this sounds paradoxical, it is quite log-
ical: if those places were not empty, allowing for each concrete matter to
be moulded in them, but already filled up, they just would not be common
anymore, and we would not be able to use them for each and every subject
matter, but just in that one described and defined with the concrete con-
tent of a particular premise.
Aristotle had ambiguous characterisations of topos—and he used
many, not always very consistent with one another. Consider the follow-
ing (Rhet. 1403a17–18, 2.26.1): ‘I call the same thing element and topos; for
an element or topos is a heading under which many enthymemes fall.’ It is
important to emphasize that by ‘element’ Aristotle does not mean a proper
part of the enthymeme, but a general form under which many concrete en-
thymemes of the same type can be subsumed. According to this definition,
topos is a general argumentative form or pattern, and concrete arguments
are instantiations of this general form. Or as Auctor ad Herennium puts it
(3–29.15ss): loci are the background and concrete arguments are imagines
(images) on that background.
In the Topics, Aristotle actually established a very complex typology
of topoi with hundreds of particular topoi: about 300 in the Topics, but just
13 See Rubinelli 2009: 8–14.
27
